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LITIGATION FINANCE IN THE
PUBLIC INTEREST
JASON M. WILSON
In the United States, public interest organizations play a vital role in
promoting access to justice and private enforcement of the law. Nevertheless,
these organizations face considerable financial constraints in litigating for
their causes.
While the non-profit sector and private bar provide
commendable support through grants and pro bono assistance, this Comment
suggests that this financing model does not adequately meet the needs of
organizations that undertake expensive litigation efforts on behalf of their
clients. In an effort to alleviate this burden, this Comment puts forth an
alternative model of funding public interest litigation by merging social
entrepreneurship with the newly revitalized practice of litigation finance.
Specifically, it proposes that a litigation financing firm organize as a benefit
corporation to provide funding for public interest litigation in exchange for a
share of any monetary relief generated. This arrangement has the potential
to pair a growing community of investors interested in making a social
impact with plaintiffs of worthwhile causes, and in the process, ensure
greater access to justice and private enforcement of the law. Additionally, it
may invigorate a growing litigation finance sector to fund cases that it has
thus far chosen not to support.
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and support of my family, friends, and Emily, who make it all possible.

385

WILSON.PAGEPROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2/3/2015 8:10 PM

386

[Vol. 64:385

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ........................................................................................ 386
I. The Status Quo: Underfunded Public Interest Litigation
in a Private Enforcement Legal Regime.................................. 391
A. The Emergence of Public Interest Litigation and
Private Enforcement of the Law ....................................... 392
B. Impact Litigation and the Backlash Against Public
Interest Organizations ....................................................... 395
C. Making Matters Worse:
The Supreme Court’s
Limiting of Attorneys’ Fees in Buckhannon .................... 399
II. Two Possible Models for Funding Public Interest Litigation ... 400
A. The Non-Profit Donor Model ........................................... 401
B. The For-Profit Litigation Finance Model ......................... 407
1. The exclusion of public interest organizations: An
incentives problem....................................................... 411
2. An uncertain regulatory scheme: Broader legal
concerns for the industry ............................................ 417
III. Social Entrepreneurship: The Middle Ground Between
For-Profit and Non-Profit Solutions to Social Problems ........ 423
A. The Benefit Corporation Model Legislation ................... 426
B. The Delaware Public Benefit Corporation Statute .......... 429
IV. The Legal Feasibility and Policy Benefits of a Social
Enterprise Model of Financing Public Interest Litigation ..... 432
A. Public Interest Litigation Financing as a Social
Enterprise Model ............................................................... 433
B. The Advantages of the Delaware Public
Benefit Corporation ........................................................ 440
1. The specific benefit as an enforcement mechanism.. 440
2. Signaling ....................................................................... 442
3. Optional third-party assessment .................................. 442
4. The benefit report is not public .................................. 443
5. Delaware law treatment of general corporate partners... 445
C. The Public Policy Benefits ................................................ 447
1. Realigning incentives between funder and plaintiff .. 448
2. Promoting a better regulatory regime for
litigation finance ........................................................ 451
Conclusion .......................................................................................... 453
Appendix ............................................................................................. 455
Diagram A ................................................................................. 455
Diagram B ................................................................................. 455
INTRODUCTION
So much of what lawyers do depends on the resources of their
clients—a reality that seems obvious to practitioners today. Yet, the
United States has largely failed to address, or even make inroads in,
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“the problem of access to justice.”1 One estimate offers a particularly
bleak portrayal of the issue: out of the 45 million low-income
individuals eligible for legal aid, there are only five to six thousand
lawyers available to serve their legal needs.2
Meanwhile,
commentators continue to call upon the profession to make a greater
pro bono commitment,3 and current proposals aimed at expanding
access often fail to provide an adequate level of reform.4
Nevertheless, public interest organizations play a considerable role
in promoting access to justice in our legal system.5 Whether it is
through direct legal aid services or impact litigation cases, public
interest organizations, by definition, “advance the interests and
causes of constituencies that are disadvantaged in the private market
or the political process relative to more powerful social actors.”6 The
United States often recognizes such interests by embracing private
enforcement of the law—that is, Congress frequently authorizes its
citizens to enforce statutory rights and regulatory objectives through

1. David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest
Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 213 (2003).
2. Id. at 211.
3. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative Assessment
of the Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129, 152
(2010) (noting that access to justice issues in the United States are often framed as
an ethical failure on the part of lawyers to provide legal services to the poor but
contending that a stronger pro bono commitment from practicing attorneys would
do little to meet the actual demand for legal services).
4. See Tom Lininger, Deregulating Public Interest Law, 88 TUL. L. REV. 727, 729
(2014) (reviewing a number of proposals aimed at increasing access to justice but
ultimately calling for reform in legal education through accredited “new ‘public
interest academies’ [that] could offer a low-cost path for students intending to
practice public interest law”).
5. The term “public interest organization” raises a definitional issue. For
purposes here, a “public interest organization” is a “nonprofit tax-exempt group[]
that attempt[s] to use law to achieve social objectives.” Deborah L. Rhode, Public
Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2027, 2029 (2008). This
narrows the type of legal practice discussed in this article to exclude other lawyers
who may try to influence policy or create social change through litigation. See
Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, Funding the Cause: How Public Interest
Law Organizations Fund Their Activities and Why It Matters for Social Change, 39 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 62, 71–72 (2014) [hereinafter Albiston & Nielsen, Funding the Cause]
(distinguishing public interest organizations from a broader category of “cause
lawyering,” which may include pro bono work in private practice and other kinds of
for-profit lawyering).
6. Scott L. Cummings, The Pursuit of Legal Rights—and Beyond, 59 UCLA L. REV.
506, 523 (2012).
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private rights of action.7
Much of the time, public interest
organizations provide the necessary legal representation for these
citizens to vindicate their claims.8
However, public interest organizations face financial challenges
that make it difficult to fully improve access to justice and promote
private enforcement of the law. A number of scholars surveying the
field have found that direct legal service providers lack resources,9
and even the most well-funded groups operate with budgets that fail
to allow for lasting and meaningful reform.10 These constraints are
often due to inadequate sources of funding for the organizations’
activities,11 with a large part of their budgets consumed by expensive
litigation efforts.12 This resource-constrained public interest sector,
7. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 669 (1986) [hereinafter Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff’s
Attorney] (noting that in contrast to other countries, a private enforcement regime in
the United States occupies various areas of the law, including antitrust, securities,
environmental, mass tort, and employment discrimination).
8. See Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41,
43–44 (2012) (asserting that public interest organizations, like the NAACP and
ACLU, are “the driving force behind large-scale public law adjudication,” as they
frequently finance and represent litigants in “litigation challenging racial
segregation, restrictions on free speech, and invasions of privacy” (internal footnotes
omitted)); see also Albiston & Nielsen, Funding the Cause, supra note 5, at 66
(discussing how public interest organizations emerged with the explicit purpose to
enforce private rights of action throughout the 1960s and 1970s, especially in
environmental law).
9. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 2042 (identifying how “direct service providers
and human rights organizations face the most obvious and painful reminders of the
overwhelming demand [for legal services] and [have] limited capacity to meet it”).
10. See id. (emphasizing survey results indicating that the “richest” public interest
organizations, such as environmental groups with multimillion dollar budgets,
reported financial constraints while facing large-scale global issues and well-funded
opponents). For example, the President of the Natural Resources Defense
Council “acknowledged that her organization was better off than others in terms
of ‘public and financial support, but the scale of the [environmental] problem is
so much greater and the lack of a national strategy on issues like global warming
is [more] appalling.’” Id.
11. See Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Litigation: Insights
from Theory and Practice, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 603, 649 (2009) (asserting that nearly
all public interest organizations reported challenges in raising funds for their
activities); see also infra notes 50–56 and accompanying text (attributing the sizeable
reduction in public interest organizations’ funding to a number of trends, with the endresult being a selective use of expensive impact litigation to enforce substantive rights).
12. See infra notes 69–70 and accompanying text (discussing survey findings that
indicate 90% of public interest organizations bring impact litigation cases that
constitute a considerable portion of their expenses).
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when paired with a legal system already lacking adequate access to
justice, raises the prospect that the law is enforced with much less
vigor than would otherwise be expected. In turn, the financial
mechanisms available to fund public interest organizations become
all the more important.
Recently, the United States has seen a renewed interest in finance
that is both for-profit and socially motivated. While these “social
entrepreneurs” are not a unanimous or uniform group,13 many of
them agree that funding social causes is too often a purely non-profit
endeavor, but also recognize that traditional business entities often
focus exclusively on profit and shareholder value.14 Instead, social
entrepreneurs advocate a middle ground: socially- and profitmotivated financing for worthwhile causes through mechanisms such
as crowdfunding, microfinance, social enterprise, impact investing,
and the social impact bond.15 Certainly, each solution has its own
proponent in what is sometimes a competitive debate,16 and critics
often dispute the effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms.17
Nevertheless, social entrepreneurs bring a new perspective on a
range of important issues.
Thus far, however, little effort has been put towards alleviating the
financial constraints faced by public interest organizations. This is
13. See, e.g., Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the New Corporate
Social Responsibility?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351, 1353 (2011) (discussing how the
social entrepreneurship movement is distinct, yet closely related to the corporate
social responsibility movement that emphasizes transparency and corporate
reporting to third parties).
14. See, e.g., Dan Pallotta, The Laws of Money and Meaning, HBR BLOG NETWORK
(Nov. 13, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://blogs.hbr.org/2012/11/the-laws-of-money-andmeaning (decrying the “false tenets” that define how the United States addresses
social issues and the “either/or proposition[] [that] [e]ither you go into charity and
give up money, or you go into business and give up meaning”).
15. See generally J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise,
Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012) (providing
an overview of the recent move towards social enterprise and the availability of
financing for such entities).
16. See, e.g., Robert T. Esposito, The Social Enterprise Revolution in Corporate Law: A
Primer on Emerging Corporate Entities in Europe and the United States and the Case for the
Benefit Corporation, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 639, 708 (2013) (responding to
Muhammad Yunus, the founder of microcredit, and his critique on social enterprise
that argues the organization’s social mission will inevitably become secondary to profit).
17. See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser & Steven A. Dean, Hunting Stag with Fly Paper:
A Hybrid Financial Instrument for Social Enterprise, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1495, 1522 (2013)
(contending that social enterprises, such as benefit corporations, may abandon their
social purpose because “[u]nlike charities and for-profit entities, social enterprises
cannot rely on external actors to enforce their respective social missions”).
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somewhat surprising because the current financing model for these
organizations remains dominated by the very same assumptions that
social entrepreneurs call into question in other areas. For decades,
the non-profit sector has been the home to the public interest
practice—philanthropic foundations provide grants to various
organizations, and private law firms offer a helping hand in the form
of pro bono time.18 This model, however, often comes up short in
addressing the needs of public interest organizations in pursuing
strategic litigation.19 Meanwhile, for-profit litigation finance—the
practice of funding the costs of litigation in return for a share in the
proceeds from any settlement or judgment20—offers little promise to
expand into public interest law as it becomes more prevalent in
commercial litigation.21 In an effort to establish a legally feasible
alternative, this Comment proposes that a litigation financing firm
organize as a social enterprise to provide funding for public interest
litigation in return for a share of any monetary relief awarded. Such
an entity has the potential to pair a growing group of impact investors
interested in making a social and monetary return with claimholders
of compelling cases, and in doing so, provide much-needed financing
to public interest organizations. This arrangement may also go a long
way towards better regulation of a growing litigation finance industry.
Part I of this Comment describes how, public interest organizations
have historically provided the necessary legal representation for
disadvantaged litigants to enforce private rights of action in the
United States legal system. This part also describes how, despite
serving this important function, these same organizations came to
experience considerable financial constraints. Part II then explains
that public interest organizations currently rely on a non-profit donor
18. See generally Albiston & Nielsen, Funding the Cause, supra note 5, at 74
(discussing how public interest organizations fund their activities through a mix of
foundational grants, pro bono assistance from the private bar, and state and federal
support). Often, these donors will not fund certain causes—for instance, Albiston &
Nielsen explain that private law firms often sponsor fellowships that flow to antipoverty and civil rights organizations, but not those that focus on controversial
environmental issues. Id. at 79.
19. See infra notes 115–21 and accompanying text (discussing the limits of the
non-profit donor model of funding public interest litigation).
20. See The Basics, BURFORD CAP., http://www.burfordcapital.com/litigationfinance/the-basics (last visited Dec. 21, 2014) (providing a definition of litigation
financing and various different financial arrangements aimed at funding lawsuits in
exchange for a monetary return).
21. See infra Part II.B.1–2 (contending that litigation financing firms do not
pursue public interest litigation because of a lack of incentives and an uncertain
regulatory regime).
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model of financing public interest litigation, while an alternative forprofit model of litigation financing provides little assistance to their
efforts. Part III then steps back to describe how social entrepreneurs
challenge the non-profit and for-profit binary that defines how we
address a variety of social issues, paying particular attention to the
benefit corporation as the most likely social enterprise to provide
concrete results in this endeavor. Part IV concludes by proposing a
social enterprise model whereby a litigation financing firm organizes
as a public benefit corporation under Delaware law with the purpose
of funding public interest cases. The public policy advantages of this
enterprise are explored as well.
I.

THE STATUS QUO: UNDERFUNDED PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION
IN A PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT LEGAL REGIME

Three developments are particularly pertinent to understanding
the importance of public interest organizations and their financial
constraints. First, at the same time as the public interest movement
took hold and major civil rights legislation was enacted, the United
States embraced a legal regime that relied on litigants to bring suit to
enforce their rights through a private right of action.22 Crucially, this
model, as it was implemented in other statutory and regulatory
frameworks, incentivized such litigation by providing attorneys’ fees
for those who brought successful suits.23 Second, public interest
organizations initially provided the legal representation for these
litigants, but due to budgetary concerns, the organizations shifted
towards bringing impact litigation as their prime means of alleviating
the social ills that the private rights of action sought to alleviate.24
Third, despite the potential for attorneys’ fees to incentivize public
interest organizations to bring suit, the Supreme Court limited the
availability of attorneys’ fees in litigation.25 Ultimately, each of these
developments contributed to today’s inapposite status quo: the United
States relies on private enforcement of the law, but there is a lack of
available capital to incentivize the attorneys who bring such litigation.

22. See infra Part I.A (detailing the history of public interest law and tracing it to
the Civil Rights Movement’s embrace of a private right of action).
23. Infra Part I.A.
24. See infra Part I.B (discussing the backlash against public interest organizations
and their funding problems).
25. See infra Part I.C (detailing the Supreme Court’s decision to disallow an
award for attorneys’ fees in cases that did not result in a court order).
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A. The Emergence of Public Interest Litigation and Private Enforcement
of the Law
The public interest movement in the United States began with the
work of the NAACP’s test case strategy employed during the 1950s.26
By assembling financing from various donors,27 the NAACP brought
lawsuits on a number of fronts, including school desegregation and
restrictive covenants.28 By 1954, the NAACP achieved a major victory
in Brown v. Board of Education29 when the Supreme Court declared
that racial segregation in public schools violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.30
While the ruling’s
immediate impact was limited,31 Brown served to show others that
litigation “protect[ed] the rights and enlarg[ed] the power of
subordinated groups, particularly when other channels of influence
[were] unavailable.”32 After the early success of Brown, other activists
formed public interest organizations that achieved a number of
successes of their own.33 Conservative advocates eventually followed
this strategy, balancing what was initially seen as a liberal-dominated

26. See Cummings & Rhode, supra note 11, at 606 (attributing the broader public
interest law movement of the 1960s to the work of the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund).
27. Mark Tushnet, Some Legacies of Brown v. Board of Education, 90 VA. L. REV.
1693, 1701 (2004) (noting that the litigation prior to Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954), was funded “by the NAACP’s members, by the plaintiffs and their
communities, and to a minor extent by foundation grants”). Certainly, some activist
litigation efforts came earlier in the century. See generally Susan D. Carle, Race, Class,
and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP (1910–1920), 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 97, 97–100
(2002) (examining the role that the NAACP’s lawyers played in formulating
litigation strategies to promote social change from 1910–1920); see also Albiston &
Nielsen, Funding the Cause, supra note 5, at 63–64 (describing the “Emergent Era” of
public interest organizations before 1965, which included the founding of the ACLU
and the NAACP’s Legal Defense Fund).
28. See Tushnet, supra note 27, at 1698 (detailing how the organization brought
suits on a number of issues across different geographic regions that often caused
internal friction among its lawyers).
29. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
30. Id. at 495.
31. See Martha Minow, Surprising Legacies of Brown v. Board, 16 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 11, 14 (2004) (describing how the “all deliberate speed” language of Brown’s
follow-up litigation allowed for southern states to resist implementation and ensure
Brown’s requirements were never fully realized).
32. Cummings & Rhode, supra note 11, at 606.
33. See Tushnet, supra note 27, at 1695 (chronicling the “proliferation of planned
litigation campaigns” after the Brown decision and its successes, including the
NAACP’s effort to limit the death penalty, the ACLU’s work on prison conditions,
and welfare rights groups’ campaigns to increase government assistance).
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field.34 By the 1960s and into the 1970s, a broader public interest
movement existed that continues to this day.35
Civil rights advocates also played a role in the more defining trend
of the 1960s: major federal legislation bringing about a number of
protections in civil rights.36 However, with the prospect of major
federal action, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act37 and its
prohibition on employment discrimination, activists were also forced
to grapple with how such statutory rights should be enforced.38 In
particular, policy debates over Title VII focused on whether the
United States should create a government agency to bring forth
lawsuits for violations of these newly conferred rights, or in the
alternative, whether it should opt for a private right of action to be
brought by individual litigants against those who violate the statutory
proscriptions.39 Conceptually, a private right of action can, inter alia,
incentivize attorneys and their clients to take legal action, thereby
ensuring greater enforcement of the law than a centralized agency

34. See Ann Southworth, Conservative Lawyers and the Contest over the Meaning of
“Public Interest Law,” 52 UCLA L. REV. 1223, 1224 (2005) (drawing attention to the
conservative advocates who organized public interest law firms to offer an intellectual
counterweight to liberal organizations that were dominating the courts).
35. Albiston & Nielsen, Funding the Cause, supra note 5, at 64.
36. See Tushnet, supra note 27, at 1714 (arguing that Brown’s troubled legacy may
lie not in its immediate effect on desegregation in public schools but how the case
served as an “early—and limited—statement” of “the Great Society’s substantive
liberalism,” that was eventually enacted in “[t]he Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, and innumerable other statutes and administrative policies”). But
see Susan D. Carle, How Myth-Busting About the Historical Goals of Civil Rights Activism
Can Illuminate Future Paths, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 167, 178–79 (2011) (arguing that
the NAACP’s test case strategy in Brown and other litigation efforts was important to
the civil rights movement but not the exclusive means by which major federal
legislation was eventually achieved).
37. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, §§ 701–16, 78 Stat. 241, 253–66.
38. See Stephen B. Burbank et al., Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
637, 692 (2013) (describing how, in opposition to democrats and civil rights activists,
congressional “[r]epublicans stripped the [Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission] of the strong administrative powers initially proposed by advocates of
the job discrimination title, and provided instead for private lawsuits with economic
incentives for enforcement, including attorney fee awards for prevailing plaintiffs”).
39. See J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in
Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1148 (2012) (characterizing the private
enforcement regime as a “conscious congressional choice,” to “put into place a
number of . . . statutes creating private rights of action—to help effectuate [the
law’s] substantive aims,” all the while “explicitly reject[ing] bureaucratic
enforcement regimes for the implementation of those directives” (footnote omitted)).
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with limited resources.40 Yet, at the same time, if those individual
litigants or their representation lack proper resources, reliance on a
private right of action can result in less, not more enforcement.41 To
the civil rights activists and legal advocates of the 1960s, private
enforcement of Title VII could have easily meant the latter, less
onerous regime.42 Instead, Title VII embodied a hybrid solution,
whereby a litigant first files at the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, allowing the agency an opportunity to facilitate a
settlement or pursue a civil action, while still preserving an
employee’s right to eventually bring his case to federal court.43
Over the next coming decades, the United States enacted a
number of statutes that effectively embraced private enforcement of
the law. In particular, the once skeptical civil rights activists quickly
realized that a private right of action, when paired with an attorney’s
fee provision, can in fact go a long ways towards properly
incentivizing lawyers to bring enforcement efforts on behalf of their
clients.44 Based partly on this success, Congress implemented this
basic model of regulatory enforcement in various other areas of the
law in the post-Civil Rights Era,45 while also further incentivizing
enforcement action through provisions that allowed for higher

40. See Burbank et al., supra note 38, at 662–63 (reviewing literature on the
public policy advantages of private enforcement of the law, which include, inter alia,
expansion in resources, increased detection, less bureaucratic involvement, and
reinforced notions of “participatory and democratic governance”).
41. See id. at 661–62 (noting that an agency with “strong formal powers, ample
resources, and leadership dedicated to vigorous enforcement” can provide distinct
advantages over a private enforcement regime that is not properly incentivized).
42. See id. at 692 (describing how, in the employment discrimination provisions
of the Civil Rights Act, activists and proponents were “initially . . . sanguine about
agency implementation and dubious about the effectiveness of private enforcement
of Title VII, even with attorney fee awards for prevailing plaintiffs”); see also Glover,
supra note 39, at 1149 (noting that civil rights advocates wanted the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission to have cease-and-desist powers rather than
rely on private litigants for enforcement).
43. See Burbank et al., supra note 38, at 688–91 (providing an overview of the
Civil Right Act’s Title VII statutory framework).
44. See id. at 693 (noting that civil rights advocates “observed levels of private
enforcement that far exceeded their expectations” because, in part, the Civil Right
Act’s attorney’s fee provision provided a necessary source of financial support that
enabled public interest organizations to litigate cases and laid the groundwork for a
“private, for-profit bar” that also brought enforcement actions).
45. See id. (asserting that public interest organizations throughout the 1970s
organized to expand Title VII’s enforcement model “beyond civil rights to embrace
environmental, consumer protection, and ‘public interest’ regulation in general”).
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damage awards.46 Today, the United States’ use of the private right of
action continues unabated, with a number of federal statutes
incentivizing individual litigants to sue with the promise of attorneys’
fees or high damage awards if successful. In fact, over 150 statutes
provide for fees to be shifted to encourage litigants to file suit, with
over 90% of actions under these statutes brought by private parties.47
B. Impact Litigation and the Backlash Against Public Interest Organizations
Integral to (and perhaps overlooked by) this private enforcement
scheme were public interest organizations that offered the resources
and representation necessary for individual litigants to bring suit. For
a short while, the private enforcement regime embraced in the 1960s
played out as it was expected to: public interest organizations
represented those clients who could not afford to pay for a lawyer,
and were an “institutionalized” part of the legal system.48 By 1975, in
what may have been a watershed moment for the public interest field,
Justice Marshall stated that public interest lawyers “built on the
[earlier] success[] of civil rights[,] . . . civil liberties,” to represent not
only “a broad range of relatively powerless minorities,” but also the
“neglected . . . interests that most of us share as consumers and as
individuals in need of privacy and a healthy environment.”49 In short,
public interest organizations became a crucial part of the private
enforcement regime.
Yet, despite his approval of the growing public interest movement,
Justice Marshall also had the forbearance to point out that the field
faced an uncertain future so long as one obstacle remained readily
apparent: funding.50 This prediction was accurate; as public interest
46. See Glover, supra note 39, at 1151 (noting that a number of current statutes
pair a private right of action with other incentivizing devices, such as “damage
multipliers, statutory damages, [or] punitive damages”).
47. Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil
Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L.
REV. 1087, 1089–90 (2007) [hereinafter Albiston & Nielsen, Procedural Attack]. One
particularly important example is the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization
Act, in which Congress provided a private right of action for victims to bring a civil
action in federal district court against the perpetrators of human trafficking to
recover damages and reasonable attorneys’ fees. See 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (2012).
48. See Albiston & Nielsen, Funding the Cause, supra note 5, at 66 (observing that
many new public interest organizations emerged during an “expansion” era in public
interest law from 1965 to 1980 as Congress increasingly embraced private
enforcement of the law).
49. Thurgood Marshall, Financing Public Interest Law Practice: The Role of the
Organized Bar, 61 A.B.A. J. 1487, 1487–88 (1975).
50. Id. at 1489.
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law became increasingly more political, its funding sources became a
target.51 Federal courts across the country cut back on doctrines once
utilized by these organizations to bring suit.52 Congress enacted more
restrictions on what type of litigants could be represented by Legal
Service Corporations.53 Law school clinics were also criticized for
bringing what some saw as overly controversial cases.54 Other legal
doctrines made it more difficult for organizations to challenge
agency action.55 Each trend ultimately strained the budgets of public
interest organizations, and by 2009, a survey of public interest
organizations found that “[v]irtually all organizations report[ed]
major difficulties in meeting their financial needs.”56
These funding problems only further influenced the type of work
pursued by public interest organizations. For example, Title VII
employment discrimination claims—once a model for private
enforcement of the law57—are now dramatically under-enforced
because of the prohibitive expense of bringing such cases to trial.58

51. See Albiston & Nielsen, Funding the Cause, supra note 5, at 66 (discussing the
“embattled” era of public interest law throughout the 1980s and 1990s, whereby
business organizations became hostile to the environmental and consumer rights
lawsuits brought by public interest organizations and the Reagan Administration
demonstrated “open hostility” to public interest organizations).
52. See Cummings & Rhode, supra note 11, at 607 (contending that throughout
the 1980s and 1990s, “[a]n increasingly conservative federal judiciary became less
hospitable to the claims of liberal public interest groups”).
53. See Luban, supra note 1, at 220–22 (detailing Congress’s enactments that
restricted legal-services lawyers and Legal Service Corporation recipients from
litigating certain cases and foreclosed representation of various types of clients). The
Legal Service Corporation is “an independent 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation that
promotes equal access to justice and provides grants for high-quality civil legal
assistance to low-income Americans.”
About LSC, LEGAL SERVICES CORP.,
http://www.lsc.gov/about/what-is-lsc#sthash.zXI39MGk.dpuf (last visited Dec. 21, 2014).
54. See Luban, supra note 1, at 236–40 (opining on the “notorious effort” by
business organizations to prevent student-lawyers from bringing high-profile lawsuits
after the Tulane Law School’s environmental law clinic prevented a factory from
being built in a predominantly African American, low-income neighborhood).
55. See Christopher Warshaw & Gregory E. Wannier, Business As Usual? Analyzing
the Development of Environmental Standing Doctrine Since 1976, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
289, 296 (2011) (analyzing the effect of the Supreme Court’s standing decisions on
cases brought by environmentalists and organized businesses).
56. Cummings & Rhode, supra note 11, at 649.
57. See Burbank et al., supra note 38, at 693 (describing how civil rights activists
embraced the early private enforcement of Title VII in the 1970s).
58. See Stephen Churchill, Making Employment Civil Rights Real, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. AMICUS, Oct. 2009, at 1, 5–6, available at http://harvardcrcl.org/wpcontent/uploads/2010/02/Churchill-FINAL.pdf (finding that the lack of
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Individual plaintiffs simply cannot afford to pay an attorney with their
own resources, so they often turn to public interest organizations.59
However, these organizations cannot afford to take on every case and
instead focus their efforts on bringing impact litigation,60 class action
or individual lawsuits aiming to achieve “systemic relief.”61
Importantly, impact litigation itself can be an extremely expensive
undertaking and involves arranging funding from a number of
different donors.62 Thus, while public interest organizations often
pursue impact litigation to enforce private rights of action and
other substantive legal rights, the costs involved in these cases only
further limit their ability to properly enforce the law and ensure
broader reform.
Public interest organizations’ greater use of impact litigation is also
increasingly criticized in academia and the press. Commentators
doubt litigation’s ability to reform societal and systemic problems.63
Former Chief Judge Patricia Wald, for instance, noted that public
interest organizations inevitably face tough choices because of their
financing troubles, not all of which have to do with the underlying

enforcement of employment discrimination laws is due to the cost of hiring a private
attorney for litigation and the unavailability of contingency fee arrangement).
59. See Christine Jolls, The Role and Functioning of Public-Interest Legal Organizations
in the Enforcement of the Employment Laws, in EMERGING LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 141, 145–46 (Richard B. Freeman et al. eds., 2005)
(explaining that the ordinary approach of hiring a private lawyer is an incomplete
strategy for enforcing employment laws in the United States).
60. See Churchill, supra note 58, at 6 (explaining public interest organizations’
“widely-held view” that financial constraints require that “impact litigation” be
pursued over individual cases); see also Jolls, supra note 59, at 163 (discussing that
public interest organizations “typically focus their energies on a small number of
impact-type cases, often at the appellate level of the judicial system”).
61. Deborah M. Weissman, Gender-Based Violence as Judicial Anomaly: Between “The
Truly National and the Truly Local,” 42 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1130 n.268 (2001) (defining
impact litigation). It is important to note that the term “impact litigation” is often
viewed as distinct from “service work” which “refers to the individual and perhaps
more routine case” brought by direct legal service providers. Id. While this
Comment focuses on impact litigation, opening up funding for litigation would also
conceivably allow for more routine service work by these organizations.
62. See, e.g., infra notes 97–104 and accompanying text (discussing the funding
arrangements and cost involved in bringing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, an impact
litigation case, to trial).
63. See generally Cummings & Rhode, supra note 11, at 607–08 (reviewing the
criticisms of public interest litigation that contend courts lack the power to enforce
wide scale reform and litigation detracts from the political process that can bring
broader reform).
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merits of the case.64 Others raise concerns—many present since the
Brown litigation65—that the interests of the public interest lawyer may
not always align with the complicated objectives of the client.66 Not
all academics agree with that premise, however, arguing that lawyers
have a defensible role in serving broader interests at stake in the legal
process.67 In response to this debate, public interest organizations
broadened the scope of their efforts to include grassroots organizing
and legislative lobbying.68 Nevertheless, litigation remains vital to the
goals of public interest organizations today69—in fact, one recent
survey found that “[n]inety percent of surveyed organizations bring
impact cases, and nearly half of organizations . . . devote at least 50%
of their efforts to such work.”70
In short, public interest organizations and their litigation efforts
cannot be divorced from the larger private enforcement regime in
the United States. Yet, it should be equally clear from their recent

64. See Patricia M. Wald, Whose Public Interest Is It Anyway?: Advice for Altruistic
Young Lawyers, 47 ME. L. REV. 3, 10 (1995) (arguing a public interest practice involves
“[j]udgment-calls on litigation made under financial constraints often involve the
least elevated of concerns: what one’s staff can do best, which judge will rule on the
case, or how much publicity the case will generate for the project”).
65. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests
in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 471 (1976) (discussing the
accountability issues in the context of the NAACP’s desegregation campaign and how
the organization’s goals differed from the plaintiff-clients); see also Tushnet, supra
note 27, at 1697–98 (criticizing the NAACP’s planned litigation campaign as “flawed
from the outset” because “plaintiffs lose control of their cases as soon as they are filed”).
66. See Michael Grinthal, Power with: Practice Models for Social Justice Lawyering, 15
U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 25, 31 (2011) (arguing that the public interest lawyers’
strategies in class action and impact litigation “have been criticized both for failing to
hold . . . lawyers accountable to the[ir] concerned constituencies, and for leaving
those constituencies as marginalized as they were prior to the litigation, though
perhaps materially better off”).
67. See Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney, supra note 7, at 678–79 (noting
that “our legal system has long accepted . . . the concept of the plaintiff’s attorney as
an entrepreneur who performs the socially useful function of deterring undesirable
conduct . . . . [A]lthough our law publicly expresses homage to individual clients, it
privately recognizes their limited relevance in this context”).
68. See Cummings & Rhode, supra note 11, at 611, 616 (contending that public
interest organizations now realize that litigation must be used “in tandem” with other
strategies to encourage support for their cause, as demonstrated by the gay rights
movement’s recent “legal and non-legal advocacy”).
69. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 2048 (finding that over the last three decades the
percentage of legal work pursued by public interest organizations, including direct
services to litigants, fell only from 60% to 51%, as legislative work, research,
education, and media increased).
70. Id.
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history that the availability of funding for their operations directly
influences their ability to properly serve this important role in our
legal system.
C. Making Matters Worse: The Supreme Court’s Limiting of Attorneys’
Fees in Buckhannon
Despite the crucial role that already underfunded public interest
organizations play in providing legal representation to litigants in the
United States’ regime of private enforcement, the Supreme Court
limited the availability of attorneys’ fees for these organizations in
Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of
Health and Human Services.71 In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court
addressed the “fee shifting” provisions of two statutes—the Fair
Housing Act72 and the Americans With Disabilities Act73—that
allowed for a “prevailing party” in litigation to collect attorneys’
fees.74 Until the Court’s decision, courts often ruled that the
“prevailing party” language included not only those litigants who
obtained a judgment or consent decree from the court, but also those
litigants who were able to “achieve[] the desired result because the
lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant’s
conduct.”75 In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court dismissed this
“catalyst theory,” holding that such a ruling “allows an award where
there is no judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of
the parties.”76 The Supreme Court also ruled out concerns that
rejecting the “catalyst theory” would push defendants to “unilaterally
moot[] an action before judgment in an effort to avoid an award of
attorneys’ fees,” or “deter plaintiffs with meritorious but expensive
cases from bringing suit.”77 The Court determined such arguments
to be “speculative and unsupported by any empirical evidence.”78
The Buckhannon case directly impacted public interest
organizations that were already financially constrained. Fee-shifting
provisions incentivize litigants to take advantage of the private rights

71. 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
72. Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968).
73. Pub. L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
74. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, 532 U.S. at 601. These “fee shifting statutes”
are exceptions to the “American Rule,” which asserts that litigants should pay their
own legal expenses absent explicit language in the statute. Id. at 602.
75. Id. at 601–02 (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 605.
77. Id. at 608.
78. Id.
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of action found so prominently throughout the United States’
statutory law.79 Indeed, the provision of attorneys’ fees was one of the
prime reasons civil rights activists in the 1960s went along with a
private enforcement regime in the first place.80 But after Buckhannon
limited the ability to collect attorneys’ fees under these statutes,
public interest lawyers could not earn back the considerable expenses
they accrued in litigating many of these cases.81 This, in turn,
deterred parties from reaching settlements82 and had an overall
“chilling effect” on public interest litigation.83
II. TWO POSSIBLE MODELS FOR FUNDING PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION
Faced with such internal resource constraints, a public interest
organization may choose to pursue impact litigation or otherwise
support a litigant exercising a private right of action by securing some
form of funding from a third party. Currently, public interest
organizations rely on donations or foundational grants for most of

79. See Albiston & Nielsen, Procedural Attack, supra note 47, at 1089–90
(arguing that fee-shifting statutes encourage litigants to bring cases that vindicate
“the broader public interest”).
80. See Burbank et al., supra note 38, at 693 (explaining that activists eventually
embraced private enforcement of the law because it was properly incentivized and
encouraged the private bar and public interest organizations to bring suit).
81. See Luban, supra note 1, at 244–45. Professor Luban provides a particularly
interesting correspondence with a public interest lawyer to illustrate the effect of
Buckhannon on public interest litigation:
Buckhannon’s significance can’t be overstated. True example: We’ve
been litigating fiercely a longstanding dispute with an agency. We have
just received a letter—after years of litigation mind you—saying, in
essence, “you’re right, we’re wrong, we will change our policy to address
your concerns.” No judicial order will or now can be entered because
the case will be moot. . . . I have no hope of getting fees here postBuckhannon, though we have, even using [the statute’s] low rates,
probably $40,000 in fees in the case. That is a big chunk of my budget.
We see this kind of pattern: lengthy litigation, and at some point,
capitulation, time and again. Up until now, using a catalyst theory, we
could often get fees in these cases . . . . Now we have no chance. I can’t
tell you how dispiriting this is for us.
Id. (quoting David Vladeck, Public Citizen Litigation Group).
82. Albiston & Nielsen, Procedural Attack, supra note 47, at 1121.
83. See id. at 1120–21 (describing the results of their empirical study indicating
that the most impacted by Buckhannon were those organizations that “engage in
impact litigation, litigate against government actors, bring class actions, [or] work in
the environmental, civil rights, or poverty areas”).
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their financial support (“the Non-Profit Donor Model”).84 Much less
frequent is the scenario where a public interest organization turns to
a specialized, for-profit litigation financing firm (“the For-Profit
Model”). These two models of funding public interest litigation, and
the respective limits of each as a financing solution, are explored below.
A. The Non-Profit Donor Model
The non-profit donor model of funding public interest litigation is
the norm for most organizations today.85 Under this arrangement,
public interest organizations form as non-profit organizations with
tax-exempt status.86 By no means does this status prevent the
organization from charging attorneys’ fees for their work87—in fact, a
number of legal aid services are now experimenting with charging
below-market rates for their services.88 The problem, however, is that
most of the public interest organization’s clients simply cannot pay
84. See infra notes 93–95 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the nonprofit donor model, whereby foundations provide grants to public interest organizations
that then rely predominantly on those funds to carry out their legal activities).
85. While not the focus of this Comment, some public interest organizations also
organize as for-profit “public interest law firms,” but these organizations also
experience budgetary issues as well. See Cummings & Rhode, supra note 11, at 624–
25 (noting that public interest law firms often have limited staff, operate under
financial constraints, and face well-funded opposition that force them to pursue only
cases that award high fees). Nevertheless, public interest law firms do litigate in the
public interest by taking on cases that generate larger damage awards that can then
be put towards less profitable but more cause-oriented cases. See Scott L. Cummings,
Privatizing Public Interest Law, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 6 (2012) (providing a case
study of a public interest law firm that funds “higher yield ‘bread and butter cases,’”
such as employment discrimination cases, in order to subsidize a higher risk, but
more cause-orientated case in the human rights field).
86. See generally Albiston & Nielsen, Funding the Cause, supra note 5, at 74
(discussing the “institutionalized model” of public interest law whereby most
organize as nonprofit 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations).
87. See Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-2 C.B. 411, §§ 4.02, 5.01–5.02 (stating that a public
interest organization “may accept attorneys’ fees in public interest cases if such fees
are paid directly by its clients,” provided that such fees do “not exceed the actual cost
incurred in each case” and the organization does not “withdraw from the case
because the litigant is unable to pay the contemplated fee”). These IRS revenue
procedures are “guidelines” issued by the agency to ensure that public interest
organizations maintain a “charitable character” and therefore properly receive taxexempt status. See id. § 1.
88. See, e.g., Michael Zuckerman, The Utah Lawyers Who Are Making Legal Services
Affordable, ATLANTIC (Aug. 7, 2014, 12:02 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/
business/archive/2014/08/the-utah-lawyers-who-are-making-legal-services-affordable/
375717 (discussing a public interest organization that does not provide its services for
free but instead chooses to charge clients on a “sliding scale” based on their incomes).
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for legal services,89 let alone afford the costs associated with a
protracted and resource-intensive impact litigation effort.
Furthermore, even if the public interest organization does receive
attorneys’ fees from a client, it must not jeopardize its tax-exempt
status by running afoul of IRS rules governing such compensation.90
Instead, public interest organizations often pursue funding from
philanthropic or government sources. Some organizations collect
membership dues, receive government funding, or raise donations
from private individuals.91 Others may turn to a fellow non-profit to
provide additional funds to the public interest organization.92 More
often than not, the public interest organization will rely heavily on
the financial support of foundations.93 In most instances, this
foundational support will come in the form of a grant that helps
cover the costs of litigation, attorneys’ fees, and the organization’s
broader advocacy efforts.94 In this arrangement, the foundation
makes payments directly to the public interest organization, which
agrees to abide by the terms of the grant in exchange for the funds.95
89. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (noting that 45 million low-income
Americans are eligible for legal aid).
90. See generally Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-2 C.B. 411, § 4.01–.05 (establishing
guidelines for public interest organizations that engage in litigation and accept
attorneys’ fees from either a client or defendant, including requirements that the
organization report all recovered fees, limit the amount of fees accepted, and
decline such fees if the “organization believes the litigants have a sufficient
commercial or financial interest in the outcome of the litigation to justify retention
of a private law firm”).
91. See generally Albiston & Nielsen, Funding the Cause, supra note 5, at 76
(providing survey results indicating that private contributions account for about
fifteen percent of public interest organizations’ budgets, with membership dues,
fundraising, and attorneys’ fees each roughly constituting only a surprising five
percent share of their overall funding).
92. See, e.g., About Us, IMPACT FUND, http://impactfund.org/?page_id=534 (last
visited Dec. 21, 2014) (noting the non-profit’s “Grant Making Program awards
funding to public interest lawyers to advance costs in systemic impact litigation”).
93. See Albiston & Nielsen, Funding the Cause, supra note 5, at 75–76 (finding that
foundations provide the greatest amount of support to public interest organizations
while federal and state funding is becoming increasingly important).
94. See Cummings & Rhode, supra note 11, at 628 (providing the results of a
recent survey indicating that a growing portion of a public interest organization’s
legal work is funded through grants from foundations).
95. See, e.g., Types of Grants, FORD FOUND., http://www.fordfoundation.org/
grants/types-of-grants (last visited Dec. 21, 2014) (defining a grant as a “commitment
by the foundation to make payments to an organization,” that ensures “grantee
autonomy over management of the funds” but also requires the grantee to agree to
terms and conditions that further the foundation’s purpose). For example, in 2014,
the Ford Foundation provided $1.3 million in a grant to the NAACP Legal Defense
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Interestingly, a public interest organization may also pursue a
foundation’s support by obtaining a program-related investment96
(“PRI”) in its litigation effort. A recent impact litigation effort
illustrates how this may work. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,97 three
workers, representing a class of 1.5 million Wal-Mart employees,
brought a discrimination lawsuit against the retailer under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, as
well as damages for back pay.98 The plaintiffs were represented by
two public interest organizations—the Impact Fund and Equal Rights
Advocates (“ERA”)—as well as several private law firms.99 Despite this
coordinated effort, the Impact Fund and ERA faced considerable
costs in litigating the case.100 The Rosenberg Foundation, a nonprofit that provides grants to public interest organizations, stepped in
and provided $500,000 in “ongoing support to ERA to continue its
role as lawyer and public interest voice in the case.”101 Notably, the
foundation did not merely donate the money in the form of a grant;
it also provided a PRI by agreeing to guarantee a loan that the Sisters
of Mercy of the Americas, a “socially responsible invest[or],” made to
the Impact Fund.102 Under this arrangement, if the plaintiffs were
successful, the loan would be repaid.103 On the other hand, if the
plaintiffs lost the case, the Rosenberg Foundation would cover the
cost of the loan.104 In this fashion, the Rosenberg Foundation and
Sister of Mercy of the Americas orchestrated an investment—rather
and Education Fund for “[a]dvocacy, [l]itigation and [r]eform” See NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., FORD FOUND., http://www.fordfoundation.org/
grants/grantdetails?grantid=121111 (last visited Dec. 21, 2014).
96. Program-related investments (“PRI”) are defined as “investments made by
foundations to support charitable activities that involve the potential return of capital
within an established time frame. PRIs include financing methods commonly
associated with banks or other private investors, such as loans, loan guarantees,
linked deposits, and even equity investments in charitable organizations or in
commercial ventures for charitable purposes.”
Knowledge Base, GRANTSPACE,
http://www.grantspace.org/Tools/Knowledge-Base/Funding-Research/Definitionsand-Clarification/PRIs (last visited Dec. 21, 2014).
97. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
98. Id. at 2547.
99. See id. at 2546 (providing list of counsel).
100. See The Rosenberg Foundation: Supporting a Class Action Against Wal-Mart,
ALLIANCE MAG., Dec. 2008, at 48, 48 (promoting the public interest
organization’s role in the Dukes litigation and detailing the Rosenberg
Foundation’s investment in the case).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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than merely a grant—that hinged on the success of an impact
litigation effort.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled against the plaintiffs in Dukes
by decertifying the class.105 Nevertheless, as detailed in an Alliance
Magazine article, this novel funding arrangement enabled the Impact
Fund to cover the “significant costs of bringing [the] landmark case
to trial.”106 Moreover, Wal-Mart felt pressured enough by the
litigation to make changes to their corporate policy by raising pay for
female workers and providing healthcare benefits.107 Thus, while the
ruling itself is controversial, the financial arrangement behind the
litigation reveals the potential for a socially-motivated entity to
finance an ongoing impact litigation effort to achieve social goals.
PRIs, however, are anything but common in the traditional nonprofit donor model of funding public interest litigation. This, in
many ways, is due to an uncertain regulatory apparatus. Under
current tax law, a foundation like the Rosenberg Foundation must
spend 5% of its funds to maintain its tax-exempt status and avoid
scrutiny from the Internal Revenue Service.108 To fulfill this
obligation, a foundation is left with two options—either it can
provide a traditional grant in furtherance of its charitable endeavor,
essentially giving the money away with no monetary return, or it can
make an investment in “for-profit ventures with the potential for a
return on [its] money and recirculating it for [its own] charitable
purposes.”109 However, in an effort to keep foundations from taking
on too much risk, the foundation faces a 10% excise tax if it makes
any investment that “jeopardize[s] the carrying out of any of its
exempt [purposes].”110 PRIs, however, work as an exception to that
105. Wal-Mart Store, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552, 2561 (2011).
106. See The Rosenberg Found., supra note 100, at 48.
107. Id. (touting the litigation’s impact prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling by
noting that Wal-Mart reworked its pay system, increased health benefits, raised
compensation for female employees by $400 million per year, and adopted a new
job posting process, all of which encouraged other competitors to alter their policies).
108. See 26 U.S.C. § 4942(e)(1) (2012); see also Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Joseph R.
Ganahl, Taxing Social Enterprise, 66 STAN. L. REV. 387, 396 (2014) (discussing how
private foundations fulfill distribution obligations under § 4942 through PRIs in
nonprofit and for-profit entities).
109. Tara Fitzgerald Urich, Business Organizations in the 21st Century: A Look at New
Legal Forms for Business that Enhance Social Enterprise, 23 S. L.J. 329, 332. For a more in
depth review of the IRS’s recent guidance on program related investments in the
context of a social enterprise, see Esposito, supra note 16, at 683.
110. 26 U.S.C. § 4944(a)(1); see Cassady V. Brewer, A Novel Approach to Using LLCs
for Quasi-Charitable Endeavors (a/k/a “Social Enterprise”), 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 678,
711 (2012) (noting that these investment provisions were included in the “Tax
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rule, allowing a foundation to make an investment so long as it is in
line with the foundation’s charitable purpose.111 Such PRIs have
unique advantages over grants in that they make a monetary return,
but unfortunately it is not clear what actually qualifies as a PRI.112
Furthermore, if a foundation makes a PRI later found to be outside
of the foundation’s purpose, then that foundation may face a
number of harsh consequences.113 Given this uncertainty, it is not
surprising that what the Rosenberg Foundation did in Dukes was the
first PRI in the Foundation’s history.114
Broadly speaking, the non-profit donor model is further limited in
its ability to provide adequate funding for public interest
organizations in a number of other ways. First, because a public
interest organization often organizes as a non-profit organization, it
cannot make distributions to its shareholders.115 This, in turn, limits
the capital available to public interest organizations to those that
want to donate funds and excludes any investors in the equity of the

Reform Act of 1969 to curb abusive or extremely risky investment-related activities
undertaken by private foundations”).
111. See 26 U.S.C. § 4944(c) (stating that “investments, the primary purpose of
which is to accomplish one or more of the purposes described in § 170(c)(2)(B),
and no significant purpose of which is the production of income or the appreciation
of property, shall not be considered as investments which jeopardize the carrying out
of exempt purposes”). Specifically, § 170(c)(2)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code
sets out that a foundation must be “organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or
international amateur sports competition . . . or for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals.” Id. § 170(c)(2)(B).
112. See Esposito, supra note 16, at 683–84 (discussing the vagueness in the
Internal Revenue Service’s guidance on program-related investments).
113. See Cassady V. Brewer & Michael J. Rhim, Using the ‘L3C’ for Program-Related
Investments, TAX’N EXEMPTS, Nov./Dec. 2009, at 11, 12–13 (noting that if a foundation
makes a PRI that does not satisfy the IRS requirements, then a possible excise tax
may be imposed or the foundation’s tax-exempt status may be revoked).
114. Rosenberg Found., supra note 100, at 48.
115. See Brewer, supra note 110, at 695. Importantly, Professor Brewer points out
just how limited the distribution requirements are on non-profits:
[N]onprofit status does not permit any type of equity participation in the
growth and enterprise value of the organization. Reasonable
compensation and bonuses may be paid to employees, but nonprofits
have no owners and hence all net earnings remain inside the nonprofit
for use in fulfilling the mission of the organization. Upon liquidation of
a nonprofit, the net proceeds must be distributed to another nonprofit
or to the government.
Id. (footnote omitted).

WILSON.PAGEPROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2/3/2015 8:10 PM

406

[Vol. 64:385

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

organization.116 Second, while the public interest organization may
turn to the private bar to fill any gap in funding, reliance on pro
bono commitments raises issues of its own.117 Third, when a public
interest organization exhausts its own resources and turns to a
foundation in hopes of securing a grant or PRI, it will likely not find a
participant as willing as the Rosenberg Foundation was in Dukes.118
Rather, foundations typically prefer alternative ventures to make their
impact and may lack the enthusiasm for protracted and lengthy
impact litigation.119 When foundations do support a public interest
organization in an impact litigation case, they often lack the legal
expertise to properly target their efforts.120
Furthermore,
foundations may be hesitant to make use of PRIs because of the
considerable tax-planning costs and uncertainty surrounding such
investments.121 In short, the non-profit donor model of funding
public interest litigation offers a limited pool of capital, lacks the
expertise and focus of a dedicated financing operation, and works
under an extensive yet uncertain regulatory regime.

116. See id.; see also supra note 94 and accompanying text (explaining that public
interest organizations rely in large part on philanthropic support from foundations
to supplement a large portion of their budgets).
117. See Cummings & Rhode, supra note 11, at 622–23 (describing how public
interest organizations increasingly rely on the pro bono work of large law firms, but
that these same firms often lack the will to bring cases against corporations, as well as
the resources and expertise to pursue a litigation effort as a piece of a larger
campaign effort for social change).
118. See, e.g., Aaron Glantz, Foundations Weighing Their Options After Wal-Mart Suit,
BAY CITIZEN (June 20, 2011, 8:19 PM), https://www.baycitizen.org/news/law/
foundations-pull-plug-wal-mart-suit (reporting that many of the foundations and
donors supporting the case pulled funding after the plaintiffs lost the
certification battle at the Supreme Court, leaving the litigants with the money
already donated by Rosenberg).
119. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 2056 (conveying survey responses that indicate
public interest organizations have “particular problems with foundations,”
many of which do not fund litigation efforts, lack expertise in public interest
litigation, or otherwise appear more interested in supporting those issues with
“measurable outcomes”).
120. See Cummings & Rhode, supra note 11, at 628 (characterizing foundations
and philanthropic donors as “strikingly unstrategic” in their donations, as “[m]any
operate with a ‘spray and pray’ approach, which spreads assistance on multiple
projects with the hope that something good will come of it”).
121. See Esposito, supra note 16, at 684 (noting that the confusion on how PRIs are
taxed have led to a reluctance on the part of foundations to utilize the arrangement).
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B. The For-Profit Litigation Finance Model
While certainly not the norm, a public interest organization could
resort to funding from a for-profit litigation financing firm.
Litigation financing122 is the practice by which “a third party (other
than the lawyer in the case) [gains] a financial stake in the outcome
of [a] case in exchange for money paid to a party in the case.”123 This
form of financing has become increasingly popular in litigation
today.124 While small funders have provided modest financing in
personal injury cases for a number of years,125 the practice is broadly
defined to encompass a more recent (and controversial) trend, by
which well-capitalized institutional players provide a variety of
different financing arrangements to litigants and businesses.126 It is
this part of the litigation finance industry that has garnered particular
attention as of late,127 as specialized litigation financing firms enter
into the market to provide financing in major commercial lawsuits,
including, among others, antitrust and intellectual property
disputes.128 This new industry promises to grow in the foreseeable
122. Alternative names for litigation finance include: “third-party litigation
financing,” “alternative litigation financing,” or “litigation funding” with various
acronyms for each. This article will refer to “litigation finance” and “litigation
financing firms” to describe the recent move towards institutions that are exclusively
devoted to funding litigation.
123. COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, AM. BAR ASS’N, INFORMATIONAL REPORT TO THE HOUSE
OF DELEGATES 5 (2012) [hereinafter COMM’N ON ETHICS, INFORMATIONAL REPORT].
124. Id. at 1.
125. See STEVEN GARBER, RAND. CORP., ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE
UNITED STATES: ISSUES, KNOWNS, AND UNKNOWNS, 8–9 (2010) (reviewing the different
segments of the litigation finance industry and separating funders who provide small
amounts of funds to plaintiffs in personal tort injury lawsuits from larger funders that
finance commercial litigation cases).
126. See COMM’N ON ETHICS, INFORMATIONAL REPORT, supra note 123, at 8
(describing a “very different segment of the [litigation-financing] market involv[ing]
public and private funds that seek to invest in large, complex commercial lawsuits,
including contract, intellectual property, and antitrust litigation”); see also How We Help,
BURFORD CAP., http://www.burfordcapital.com/how-we-help/#sthash.ZcfoaD8U.dpuf
(last visited Dec. 21, 2014) (stating that Burford provides “straightforward funding of
the legal fees and expenses for a case (or a portfolio of cases) to a wide and varied
suite of corporate finance solutions for businesses and law firms”).
127. See, e.g., Investing in Someone Else’s Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/11/15/investing-in-someone-elseslawsuit (exploring the various issues involved in specialized litigation financing and
providing a number of differing viewpoints on the practice).
128. See, e.g., How It Works, JUR. ASSET MGMT., http://juridicamanagement.com/
litigation-finance/how-it-works.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2014) (stating that Juridica
provides funding to “corporate claimants” but does not fund personal injury,
product liability, mass tort, or class actions); see also COMM’N ON ETHICS,
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future—one of these specialized firms, Gerchen Keller Capital,
amassed $260 million for the sole purpose of investing in complex
litigation in early 2014,129 while another firm, Burford Capital
(“Burford”), achieved a 46% return on its litigation investments
across its entire portfolio.130
A litigation financing firm operates by raising capital and then
selecting cases that will likely be profitable. The firm incorporates as
a for-profit company that specializes strictly in funding litigation
efforts.131 Unlike a traditional law firm, this entity is not governed by
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,132 which allows it to have a
board of directors and raise capital from a number of non-lawyer
shareholders and outside investors.133 Many of these investors are
high net worth individuals or traditional investors such as investment
funds.134 Some firms are even publicly traded.135 Once capitalized,
INFORMATIONAL REPORT, supra note 123, at 8 (noting that firms finance antitrust
lawsuits and intellectual property cases).
129. William Alden, Litigation Finance Firm Raises $260 Million for New Fund, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 12, 2014, 10:33 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/12/litigationfinance-firm-raises-260-million-for-new-fund/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
130. See Jonathan T. Molot, The Feasibility of Litigation Markets, 89 IND. L.J. 171, 180
(2014) (noting, however, that this high return rate is “net of losses, but . . . took time
to generate and do[es] not reflect uncommitted capital still in reserve”).
131. See, e.g., Who We Are, BURFORD CAP., http://www.burfordcapital.com/who-weare (last visited Dec. 21, 2014) (describing the company as “the world’s largest
provider of investment capital and risk solutions for litigation”).
132. See Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding,
95 MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1294 (2011) [hereinafter Steinitz, Whose Claim] (stating that
“finance firms are not subject to the constraints imposed by the canons of
professional responsibility”). Nevertheless, practicing attorneys who represent clients
funded by litigation financing firms are governed by ethical rules. See COMM’N ON
ETHICS, INFORMATIONAL REPORT, supra note 123, at 39 (concluding that “[l]awyers
must adhere to principles of professional independence, candor, competence,
undivided loyalty, and confidentiality when representing clients in connection with
[litigation finance] transactions”).
133. See Steinitz, Whose Claim, supra note 132, at 1294 (contrasting litigation
financing firms from law firms because litigation financing firms “can take on
matters that conflict, can solicit clients, and have nonlawyers in management
positions,” as well as access financing from outside investors, join in the “ventures of
their clients,” and receive “alternative forms of compensation such as equity in
intellectual property or exploration and drilling rights”).
134. GARBER, supra note 125, at 8.
135. See Jasminka Kalajdzic et al., Justice for Profit: A Comparative Analysis of
Australian, Canadian and U.S. Third Party Litigation Funding, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 93, 130
(2013) (explaining that Juridica Investments and Burford Capital, two firms
publically traded on the London Stock Exchange, often invest in U.S. commercial
litigation with approximately $200 million in managed assets); see also Molot, supra
note 130, at 178 (explaining that Burford raised capital in London (but also invested
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the litigation financing firm, often under the management of finance
professionals and individuals with litigation experience,136 analyzes
cases to determine whether the underlying claims of the prospect
case have merit.137 If the plaintiff passes this initial due diligence
process, “the financing company will advance amounts to cover
attorneys’ fees and the other costs of litigation,” which “typically are
made to the claimant or its outside litigation counsel, in return for a
percentage of any eventual recovery.”138 In many respects then, a
specialized litigation financing firm acts as a “middle man” that pools
capital from a variety of investors and shareholders and then advances
funds to plaintiffs in exchange for a share in the litigation proceeds.139
Nevertheless, the details on the contracts between these various
players are relatively scarce.140 To combat this uncertainty, Professor
Steinitz launched an online project in an effort to create a model
litigation finance arrangement.141 In particular, Professor Steinitz
suggests that litigation financing firms organize like venture capital
firms by, among other things, establishing limited partnership
agreements with their investors.142 Under this arrangement, investors
would be limited partners who earn a return once the case has

in United States litigation) because investors there “understood the [litigation
finance] model and thought that it would work just as well in the United States as in the
United Kingdom—indeed, potentially better given the sheer size of the U.S. market”).
136. See Molot, supra note 130, at 178 (detailing Burford Capital’s due diligence
process whereby its legal team evaluates the underlying facts and merits of a case,
applicable laws, possible forums, the lawyers hired (or “propose[d] to[ be] hire[d]”)
by the client, and the parties’ monetary resources).
137. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op.
2011-2 (2011) [hereinafter Formal Op. 2011-2].
138. Id.
139. Alden, supra note 129 (discussing a litigation financing firm that
originally invested in other companies who fund cases on behalf of investors but
eventually “decided to ‘cut out the middleman’ and set up a firm to invest in the
claims themselves”).
140. See GARBER, supra note 125, at 8 n.3 (explaining that a lack of public
information on litigation financing firms and their contracts is due to an absence of
any obligation to make their activities or contracts public).
141. See generally Maya Steinitz & Abigail C. Field, A Model Litigation Finance
Contract, http://litigationfinancecontract.com (last visited Dec. 21, 2014) (providing
various posts and discussions on the litigation finance contract and how the industry
should organize itself). The project is now complete, culminating in the release of
Maya Steinitz & Abigail C. Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract, 99 IOWA L. REV.
711 (2014) [hereinafter Steinitz & Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract].
142. Maya Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455, 500–
01 (2012) [hereinafter Steinitz, Litigation Finance Contract].
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generated an award.143 The litigation financing firm would then acts
as the general partner, entering into contracts with claimholders on
behalf of the limited partnership’s funds as “a money management
company that employs professionals with specialized expertise.”144
The litigation financing firm then makes money by earning a “small
management fee” on the assembled pool of capital, and earns a
larger share of any proceeds if the plaintiff’s litigation is successful.145
This structure and method of compensation separates passive
investors from the management of the litigation financing firm,
allows for a fund to be established for a portfolio of cases, and
ultimately “aligns the [litigation financing firm’s] interests with those
of the investors.”146 As between the litigation financing firm and the
plaintiff, another contractual relationship is established that consists
of transferring a share of the proceeds of the case to the financing
firm in exchange for the advance of funds.147
As can be imagined, litigation finance garners considerable media
attention and academic research.
Pointedly, a number of
commentators have questioned whether litigation funding is really a
“boon for access to justice,” or just disguising the “commodification
of litigation.”148 The financing firms are particularly adamant about
the former argument, asserting that if the practice is allowed to fully
flourish in the United States, non-recourse lending will flow from
investors to disadvantaged claimholders with meritorious cases and
provide greater access to the judicial system.149 Some also argue that
litigation financing has the potential to support the private
enforcement legal regime, while leveling out the bargaining
dynamics between individual plaintiffs and “repeat players” such as
corporations.150 While all seemingly possible in the abstract, critics

143. Id.
144. Id. at 496.
145. Id. at 500.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 503.
148. Kalajdzic et al., supra note 135, at 95.
149. See, e.g., The Basics, BURFORD CAP., http://www.burfordcapital.com/litigationfinance/the-basics (last visited Dec. 21, 2014) (“Open access to civil justice is a
fundamental characteristic of any meaningful legal system, but the onerous costs of
pursuing cases can put the courts out of reach to many. By making it economically
feasible to bring worthy claims, litigation finance allows parties to pursue cases that
might otherwise have proved too costly.”).
150. See Steinitz, Whose Claim, supra note 132, at 1336 (describing how, in theory,
litigation financing firms can provide the resources for litigants to bring suit, and
“[i]n the process . . . promote not only private enforcement of environmental and
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respond that the litigation-financing industry has simply not lived up
to its promise: instead of fostering access to the legal system,
litigation financing has been criticized as favoring already favored
commercial parties,151 and providing little assistance to
disenfranchised groups for which access to justice is a very real
problem.152 This reality is driven, in part, by two trends in the
industry: the exclusion of public interest litigation and an uncertain
regulatory regime.
1.

The exclusion of public interest organizations: An incentives problem
Much of the litigation finance industry’s deficiencies in providing
access to justice can be attributed to its exclusion of public interest
organizations and their clients. This is in many ways a problem of
incentives. First, litigation financing firms, as they currently operate,
are concerned with profit.153 This is not surprising, because these
specialized firms have investors and shareholders to whom they owe a
duty to maximize profits154—the so-called “[s]hareholder

human rights standards, but also engage in rule change in areas where the funder
may have a similar, or even greater, incentive than the plaintiffs to play for rules”).
151. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Ideal Versus Reality in Third-Party Litigation Financing,
8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 593, 610 (2012) (arguing that litigation financing firms “have
little incentive to finance cases where plaintiffs face significant barriers to justice”
because “investors face the highest potential returns in the types of cases where the
underlying substantive law creates risk and cost imbalances that already give plaintiffs
the advantage”).
152. See Nicholas Dietsch, Note, Litigation Financing in the U.S., the U.K., and
Australia: How the Industry Has Evolved in Three Countries, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 687, 710
(2011) (finding that the growth of litigation finance has not resulted in increased
access to justice for low-income plaintiffs as firms fund primarily commercial litigation
or otherwise wait for courts to further clarify their position on the practice).
153. See GARBER, supra note 125, at 23–24. In particular, Garber describes how the
litigation financing firms, which he calls alternative litigation finance firms (“ALFs”),
are primarily focused on earning a return for their own investors:
ALF suppliers offer capital to ALF demanders in hopes of making
money—business profits in the cases of ALF companies and investment
income in the cases of other ALF suppliers. And, it seems, ALF suppliers
such as investment funds are willing to accept substantial risks associated
with particular investments in exchange for opportunities to achieve
unusually high rates of return on their capital. ALF companies seek to
profit in an environment in which they wish to please their investors.
Id.
154. Steinitz & Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 141, at 739
(explaining that litigation financing firms have a duty to maximize profit for their
investors but lack any fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs).
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maximization norm” that pervades in other contexts.155 For this very
reason, firms tend to go where the money lies—by funding commercial
lawsuits with the largest potential for an award or large settlement.156
Public interest organizations, on the other hand, are not
predominantly concerned with profit;157 they often bring impact
litigation with the precise goal of obtaining injunctive and equitable
relief.158 They may also pursue cases against the government with the
goal of obtaining a change in policy,159 or may even find value in a
case that is eventually lost.160 Thus, litigation financing firms have
little incentive to fund the cases public interest organizations bring,
many of which lie in the controversial environmental, employment
discrimination, and civil rights areas of law.161 It does, however, beg
155. See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Representing Social Enterprise, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 215,
216 (2013) (explaining the so-called “shareholder wealth maximization” norm that
serves as “the positive foundation and normative goals of corporate law” which
prioritizes “the interests of shareholders and discount[s] the interests of
nonshareholder constituents of corporations including employees, creditors,
suppliers, and customers”).
156. See supra notes 125, 152 and accompanying text (explaining that litigation
financing firms fund cases in the commercial realm to the exclusion of poor and
disadvantaged parties while small funders provide financing to individual litigants in
tort law suits).
157. Albiston & Nielsen, Funding the Cause, supra note 5, at 62–63 (distinguishing
public interest organizations from the “business-like model of modern private law
offices” because their practice often includes clients who do not pay for their
representation, involves cases that may often be inherently risky, and involves nontraditional activities such as “community outreach and education, talking with the
media, organizing coalitions, [and] participating in demonstrations”).
158. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 303–04 (2010) [hereinafter Coffee, Litigation Governance]
(explaining that public interest organizations, such as the ACLU, Legal Defense
Fund, and Sierra Club, often pursue injunctive or equitable relief but may also seek
monetary damages when representing litigants in class action lawsuits).
159. See La Belle, supra note 8, at 43–44 (explaining that public interest
organizations often represent litigants in public law adjudication).
160. See Ben Depoorter, The Upside of Losing, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 817, 821 (2013)
(arguing that losing a case can have more concrete benefits in drawing attention to
social problems, the inadequacy of current solutions, and serve as a mobilizer for
broader efforts); supra note 107 and accompanying text (touting the impact made by
the public interest organization and foundation that funded the Dukes litigation
despite losing the case at the Supreme Court).
161. Steinitz & Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 141, at 739–40
(explaining that the duty to maximize profit will push funders to pursue cases that
emphasize “monetary remedies over non-monetary ones such as injunctive relief,
declaratory relief, a public apology, a change of an internal policy, or a change in the
law”); see also Coffee, Litigation Governance, supra note 158, at 342 (explaining that
litigants in environmental law, employment discrimination, and civil rights class
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the question whether the litigation finance industry can ever make
good on its promise to provide access to justice and private
enforcement of the law while it systematically excludes public interest
organizations from its client base.
Additionally, public interest organizations may avoid for-profit
litigation financing because of concerns that the industry may
compromise the public interest organization’s attorney-client
relationships. Quite often, litigation financing firms want to be able
to select the plaintiff’s attorney in the cases in which they invest.162
They also may want some say in whether to settle a case.163 By doing
this, funders gain control over a lawsuit in order to “monetize” their
investment for shareholders and investors.164 For a public interest
organization that owes a duty to provide independent and objective
counsel to its clients,165 however, this is particularly worrisome. First,
ceding representation of the case to another lawyer of the financing
firm’s choosing may complicate the public interest organization’s
strategy in what is usually a smaller piece in a larger coordinated
effort of grassroots organizing and advocacy.166 Second, as discussed
supra, the public interest organization’s clients will quite often make
claims in areas of the law that “involve bundled interests, both
monetary and nonmonetary, underlying large and complex legal

actions often seek injunctive and equitable relief but the litigation financing firm is
only concerned with obtaining a monetary award).
162. See Steinitz, Whose Claim, supra note 132, at 1323 n.195 (recognizing that
funders and plaintiffs commonly debate who will select counsel).
163. See Steinitz, Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 142, at 484 (acknowledging
concerns that litigation financing may limit a client’s control over a case, especially
regarding decisions on whether to settle a case).
164. See Steinitz, Whose Claim, supra note 132, at 1323 (“[F]inanced clients . . . will
pay a price in the form of diminished control over their case—from choice of
attorney to settlement. The argument against litigation funding based on the client’s
diminished control is, in essence, one of separation of ownership and control
between the client and the funder.” (footnote omitted)). Some funders have
explicitly claimed that their companies do not apply pressure to the plaintiff’s
control of the case. See Molot, supra note 130, at 178 (describing how Burford acts a
“passive provider” in funding cases by not attempting to influence litigation strategy,
settlement negotiation, or the attorney-client relationship). But see Kalajdzic et al.,
supra note 135, at 137 (arguing that the potential still exists for firms to control
litigation despite firms publically disclaiming any interest in doing so).
165. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2014) (stating that a lawyer must
exercise independent professional judgment when representing a client).
166. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (explaining that as a result of
criticism on public interest litigation organizations have resituated their legal efforts
in a broader campaign of advocacy and organizing).
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claims.”167 Litigation financing firms, in comparison, only seek an
eventual share in the monetary proceeds of a settlement and may
therefore pressure public interest organizations to settle early for a
monetary amount, while a public interest organization may want to
pursue the case further to obtain the benefits of non-monetary relief
for its client.168 In fact, the financing firm may be under pressure
from its own investors and shareholders to settle the case and
distribute a return.169 Conversely, a public interest organization or
client that is more concerned with a large damage award is now freed
from “the risk of a loss, [and] may now have an incentive to resist a
reasonable and rational early settlement in favor of a late settlement
or even a risky and expensive trial.”170 Either way, the litigation
financing firm, motivated by maximizing profits, may pull on the
loyalty owed by the public interest lawyer to his client, and push him
or her to pursue strategies that are not in line with the best interests
or objectives of the client.171 Indeed, litigation financing firms have
hesitated to take an interest in funding class actions, where public
interest organizations stand to earn larger damage awards, until these
ethical concerns facing the industry are resolved.172 In short, so long
as the interests between the litigation financing firm remain at odds
with the public interest organization and their client, the firm is
incentivized to seek control of the litigation to mitigate the risks of a
poor monetary return.173 For a public interest organization that

167. Steinitz, Whose Claim, supra note 132, at 1322.
168. Id. at 1321 (maintaining that “[n]onmonetary remedies, such as injunctions,
declaratory relief, and specific performance, become unattractive either because a
plaintiff has lost interest or because the funder pressures for a simple monetary
award instead of a socially desirable remedy such as injunction or clean-up”).
169. Kalajdzic et al., supra note 135, at 137 (asserting that litigation financing firms
have investors and shareholders who may hope to achieve a higher return by pushing
for an early settlement of a case); see also supra note 153 and accompanying text
(explaining the various players in the industry and how the firms seek profit for their
own investors).
170. Steinitz, Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 142, at 489–90.
171. See Anthony J. Sebok & W. Bradley Wendel, Duty in the Litigation-Investment
Agreement: The Choice Between Tort and Contract Norms when the Deal Breaks Down, 66
VAND. L. REV. 1831, 1851 n.44 (2013) (analogizing these conflict-of-interest problems
in the funder-client relationship to the insurance context).
172. See Kalajdzic et al., supra note 135, at 134 (explaining that litigation financing
firms have not embraced class actions and have stuck to funding commercial
litigation cases because of fears of being portrayed as either stirring up litigation or
causing ethical problems in the attorney-client relationship).
173. See Sebok & Wendel, supra note 171, at 1853 (asserting that a litigation
financing firm’s lack of control is “not a risk per se,” so long as the investor remains
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brings litigation to make an impact, this is an untenable solution to its
financial challenges.
Nevertheless, there is at least one rare, albeit telling, example of a
litigation financing firm advancing funds to a public interest
organization in the environmental context. In 1993, an indigenous
population brought suit in Ecuador, as well as New York, claiming
that Texaco—which was later bought by Chevron—polluted the
Amazon rainforest during its oil extraction from 1964 to 1992.174
After their case was dismissed in New York, the plaintiffs, aided by an
American attorney named Steven Donzinger, secured a judgment
against Chevron in Ecuador for $17.2 billion.175 In an effort to
enforce this sizable judgment, the Ecuadorean plaintiffs, acting
through the efforts of Donzinger, sought funding from Burford
Capital, a specialized, New York-based litigation-financing firm.176 In
turn, Burford brought in outside litigation counsel from a
Washington, D.C.-based law firm.177 The agreement and relationship
between these parties was described in an extensive Washington Post
article, indicating that Burford originally invested $15 million in the
litigation in exchange for 5.545% of any recovery and a minimum
return of $55.5 million.178 Eventually, however, revelations came to
light about the underlying scientific report on the Ecuadorean
environmental damage, leading to a Chevron-brought lawsuit against
Steven Donzinger for racketeering.179 This litigation led to disclosure
of Donzinger’s case files, which revealed a litigation financing
contract set up between Burford, a non-profit—“Friends of the
Defense of the Amazon”—and the individual plaintiffs.180
“confident that the claim owner’s interests aligned with his own,” allowing the
investor to forgo control of the litigation and “free ride off of the litigant’s efforts”).
174. Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 235 (2d Cir. 2012).
175. Id. at 234–36.
176. See Steve Mufson, Why Chevron Is Suing One of D.C.’s Most Powerful Lobbying
(July
2,
2013),
Firms
Over . . .
the
Amazon
Jungle?,
WASH. POST
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/07/02/why-chevron-issuing-one-of-d-c-s-most-powerful-lobbying-firms-over-the-amazon-jungle (providing a
description of the lawsuit).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See Daniel Fisher, Litigation-Finance Contract Reveals How Investors
Back Lawsuits, FORBES (June 7, 2011, 7:12 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
danielfisher/2011/06/07/litigation-finance-contract-reveals-how-investors-backlawsuits (explaining the background of the Chevron litigation and the federal court
ruling that eventually resulted in the public disclosure of the contract between
Burford and the plaintiffs).
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The contract between Burford and the Ecuadorean plaintiffs raises
a number of interesting questions on how to best structure a
litigation finance agreement. A full provision-by-provision analysis of
this arrangement is available,181 but two provisions of the contract are
particularly striking and relevant to this Comment. First, the contract
rejected any fiduciary duty182 between the litigation financing firm
and the plaintiff.183 This is notable, because a fiduciary duty would
have the potential to curtail a litigation financing firm’s excessive
influence over attorneys or exercise of control over litigation.184
Second, the contract’s definition of “award,” from which Burford
would eventually have taken a share, includes any monetary, as well as
nonmonetary relief, such as a cleanup or prevention measure.185 The
181. See generally Steinitz, Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 142, at 465–79
(providing a case study of the Burford’s contract with the plaintiffs in the Chevron–
Ecuador case and comparing its provisions to a venture capital’s firm investment).
182. A fiduciary duty is the highest contractual relationship that can be embraced
by parties. It is defined as “[a] duty of utmost good faith, trust, confidence, and
candor owed by a fiduciary . . . to the beneficiary” and “a duty to act with the highest
degree of honesty and loyalty toward another person and in the best interests of the
other person . . . .” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (9th ed. 2009).
183. Steinitz, Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 142, at 469 n.40 (explaining the
contract’s provisions that explicitly reject any joint partnership between the
funder and the plaintiff, including a fiduciary duty); see also TRECA FIN.
SOLUTIONS (AS THE FUNDER) & CLAIMANTS, FUNDING AGREEMENT § 16.4 (2010)
[hereinafter TRECA AGREEMENT], available at http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/
chevron_fundingagreement.pdf (“The Parties agree that nothing in this Agreement
shall give rise to or be construed to create a fiduciary, lawyer-client, agency or other
relationship between the Parties or between their counsel, notwithstanding the
information or observations or opinions that may be shared between them.”).
184. Steinitz & Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 141, at 740
(explaining that “[t]he best tool to minimize the conflicts created by profit
concerns . . . in favor of the plaintiff is a fiduciary duty[,]” but that “[c]reating such a
duty would not be a panacea as it would be offset by the funders’ duty to its shareholders”
(emphasis added)).
185. See Steinitz, Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 142, at 468–69
(summarizing and quoting the contract’s definition of award); see also TRECA
AGREEMENT, supra note 183, sched. 3.
For the avoidance of doubt, “Award” shall include (without limitation)
any cash or non-cash value or benefit conveyed to, or any cash or noncash obligation imposed on or accepted by, any person or entity in
connection with the Claim or the resolution or termination thereof,
including (without limitation) the value of, or any obligation to perform or
conduct, any investigation or other assessment (including (without limitation) to
assess risk to any human or the environment), clean-up, remediation, or
mitigation or prevention or measures arising from or relating to the Claim
(including (without limitation) any adverse impacts underlying the Claim).
TRECA AGREEMENT, supra note 183, sched. 3. (emphasis added).
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effect of this provision was clear—“if a court awards remedial
measures for the benefit of the harmed community, the [non-profit
and individual plaintiffs as claimholder] must pay the monetary value
of the Funder’s portion of such remedial measures.”186 This reveals
another possible issue with the for-profit litigation financing firm’s
involvement in public interest litigation. Even if the prospect of an
award is large enough for the financing firm to get involved in a
given case, it might fund only the litigant’s pursuit of monetary relief,
leaving any non-monetary relief to come out of the plaintiffs’ share of
the proceeds.187 In many ways then, a litigation financing firm’s
interest in the case begins and ends with its potential for profit.
2.

An uncertain regulatory scheme: Broader legal concerns for the industry
The for-profit litigation finance industry has also failed to fund
public interest organizations (and provide access to justice) because
it operates under an uncertain regulatory regime. This uncertainty is
due to two primary issues: (1) champerty, a common law doctrine
that purports to prohibit third-parties from financing and profiting
from litigation; and (2) concerns that disclosures to the financing
firm by the plaintiff’s attorney may waive protection of the attorneyclient privilege and the attorney-work product doctrine.
Champerty is a common law doctrine that places the enforceability
of litigation contracts in considerable doubt. “A champertous
agreement is one in which an owner of a legal claim and a third,
unrelated party agree to divide amongst themselves the proceeds of a
litigation, if successful.”188 In many ways, champerty is a holdover of
the past—it originated in English feudal society as a way of
preventing wealthy individuals from burdening courts with a less
wealthy person’s claims to land in return for a slice of that land if
successful.189 Nevertheless, the doctrine came to the United States
through the common law as various states sought to prevent
186. Steinitz, Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 142, at 470.
187. See Steinitz & Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 141, at 740
n.120 (explaining that “Burford’s investment in the Chevron–Ecuador dispute . . .
penalized plaintiffs for receiving clean-ups rather than funds by requiring them to
pay the funder for its pro-rated share of such a remedy”).
188. Steinitz, Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 142, at 486.
189. See COMM’N ON ETHICS, INFORMATIONAL REPORT, supra note 123, at 10; see also
Joshua G. Richey, Comment, Tilted Scales of Justice? The Consequences of Third-Party
Financing of American Litigation, 63 EMORY L.J. 489, 503 (2013) (explaining that the
feudal-era champerty doctrine was established to deal with the practice whereby a
litigant, backed by a wealthy third party, would sue for property rights that he did not
own but nevertheless extract a favorable verdict by overwhelming the court system).
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“speculation in lawsuits, the bringing of frivolous lawsuits, or financial
overreaching by a party of [a] superior bargaining position.”190 The
doctrine laid dormant for a number of years until civil rights
opponents, partly in response to the success of the Brown litigation,
attempted to use the doctrine to prohibit the NAACP from soliciting
clients and financing lawsuits for its test case strategy.191 Ultimately,
the Supreme Court stepped in to protect the NAACP’s right to solicit
plaintiffs for potential litigation under the First Amendment.192
However, the Court later held that the prohibition on champerty, as
applied to a lawyer’s broader “procurement of remunerative
employment [was] only marginally affected with First Amendment
concerns” and “falls within the State’s proper sphere of economic
and professional regulation.”193
As it applies today in a number of states, champerty completely
bars a litigation financing firm’s agreement with the plaintiff. For
example, the Minnesota Court of Appeals refused to enforce a
litigation financing agreement and refused to abandon the champerty
doctrine even if other devices protected litigants.194 Similarly, the
Supreme Court of Ohio specifically found a contract champertous
and unenforceable because it “prolong[ed] litigation and reduce[ed]
settlement incentives.”195 The Ohio court also found it particularly
disturbing that the disputed agreement explicitly stated that the
financing company should earn “substantial profit” on the contract.196

190. Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1226 (Mass. 1997).
191. See Steinitz, Whose Claim, supra note 132, at 1287 (contending that the
champerty doctrine in the United States was used by opponents of civil rights to
“stifle social progress”); see also Comment, The South’s Amended Barratry Laws: An
Attempt to End Group Pressure Through the Courts, 72 YALE L.J. 1613, 1613 (1963)
(detailing a number of southern states that in the 1950s “suddenly discovered a need
to reinvigorate and extend existing champerty” with a “flurry of legislation”).
Interestingly, the comment asserts that this was done in part to respond to civil rights
groups’ successful litigation. Id. at 1613.
192. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 419, 437 (1963) (holding that a Virginia
statute banning “the improper solicitation of any legal or professional business,” as
applied to the NAACP’s legal efforts, constituted a violation of “the Fourteenth
Amendment by unduly inhibiting protected freedoms of expression and
association”).
193. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 459 (1978).
194. Johnson v. Wright, 682 N.W.2d 671, 680 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (“Although
there are safeguards in place to alleviate the potential evils associated with
champertous agreements, respondent fails to provide a compelling reason to
completely abandon the doctrine.”).
195. Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio 2003).
196. Id.
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Nevertheless, a number of jurisdictions have limited the doctrine
to allow the litigation financing industry to establish itself in the
In
United States. This trend, however, is not uniform.197
Massachusetts, for instance, the state’s highest court explicitly
questioned whether champerty “continues to serve any useful
purpose” and struck down the doctrine in light of an agreement
where an individual fronted the costs of litigation.198 The court
reasoned that other mechanisms exist to address concerns with
litigation financing agreements, such as the prohibition on excessive
fees, misconduct sanctions, regulations against frivolous lawsuits, and
contract “doctrines of unconscionability, duress, and good faith,
[which] establish standards of fair dealing between opposing
parties.”199 A number of states have since followed suit, and in 2011,
the ABA signaled its agreement with this reasoning.200
In other states, champerty still reigns but applies narrowly. In a
White Paper on the subject, the ABA summarized how champerty
currently impact litigation finance, and found that a number of states
allow funders to take a share of litigation proceeds so long as the
arrangement is not:
(1) clearly promoting “frivolous” litigation (e.g. a lawsuit . . . that does
vindicate a genuine legal interest of the party bringing the suit);
(2) engaging in “malice champerty,” which is the support of
meritorious litigation motivated by an improper motive (e.g. prima
facie tort in NY); [or]
(3) “intermeddling” with the conduct of the litigation (e.g.
determining trial strategy or controlling settlement).201

New York is particularly illustrative of this approach to the
champerty doctrine.202 There, the champerty doctrine is part of the
197. See Kalajdzic et al., supra note 135, at 134–35 (noting that while Australia has
largely done away with champerty, the United States has not conclusively answered
whether champerty is implicated by litigation finance and only eliminated the
“antiquated” doctrine in some states).
198. Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1226 (Mass. 1997) (finding that the
overall “decline of champerty . . . is symptomatic of a fundamental change in society’s
view of litigation[,] [turning] from a social ill . . . [that] should be minimized to a
socially useful way to resolve disputes” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
199. Id. at 1226–27.
200. See COMM’N ON ETHICS, INFORMATIONAL REPORT, supra note 123, at 9
(concluding that because “existing ethical and legal obligations of lawyers and their
clients . . . insure that litigation be conducted in good faith and non-frivolously, it is
unclear why the historical concerns of the common law would justify today placing
special burdens on litigation funded by third parties”).
201. COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, AM. BAR. ASS’N, WHITE PAPER ON ALTERNATIVE
LITIGATION FINANCE 12 (2012) [hereinafter COMM’N ON ETHICS, WHITE PAPER].
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state’s statutory law.203 Under interpretation of this statute, New York
courts find an agreement champertous if a claim is “acqui[red]” with
the “primary purpose” to bring a lawsuit.204 “Willingness to resort to
litigation, however, will not render a transaction champertous if the
primary purpose of the transaction is to enforce a legitimate claim . . . .”205
For this reason, New York does not prohibit litigation financing firms
from funding a case in exchange for a share of any monetary recovery so
long as the case is “already in existence” and the litigant does not lose
control of the case.206 Tellingly, no court in the state has yet held that a
litigation finance contract amounts to champerty,207 but the doctrine’s
applicability remains anything but clear.208
Lastly, a litigation financing firm’s involvement in a case may
implicate waiver of attorney-client privilege and the protection of the
attorney-work product doctrine. Attorney-client privilege protects
202. See generally Steinitz & Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract, supra note
141, at 725–28 (reviewing champerty case law in New York).
203. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 489 (McKinney 2004) (“No person . . . shall solicit, buy or
take an assignment of, or be in any manner interested in buying or taking an
assignment of a bond, promissory note, bill of exchange, book debt, or other thing
in action, or any claim or demand, with the intent and for the purpose of bringing an
action or proceeding thereon . . . .” (emphasis added)).
204. SB Schwartz & Co. v. Levine, 918 N.Y.S.2d 171, 172 (App. Div. 2011).
205. Id. at 173. New York courts also maintain that a transaction will not
constitute champerty “if the party obtaining the claim . . . does so as part of a
larger transaction and the intent to commence litigation is incidental to that
larger transaction.” Id.
206. Steinitz & Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 141, at 727; see
also Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 117–18 (2011)
(detailing the New York approach to champerty and reviewing cases). In particular,
Professor Sebok explains that the New York doctrine “is concerned almost exclusively
with contracts made before the lawsuit is filed.” Id. at 118. This rule serves as a
“rough proxy” for indicating that the litigant “truly desired to have his or her right
vindicated, and was not influenced by the encouragement of a stranger (whose
encouragement may have taken the form of a bribe).” Id. at 118–19. Professor
Sebok goes on to question why this matters so long as the underlying claims have
merit. Id. at 119.
207. Formal Op. 2011-2, supra note 137.
208. For example, one court implied that a plaintiff’s adding of new claims to an
amended complaint after a financing agreement could constitute champerty. See
Richbell Info. Servs., Inc. v. Jupiter Partners, 723 N.Y.S.2d 134, 138 (App. Div. 2001)
(noting that after a claim was assigned to another party an “amended complaint
[was] filed . . . [that] was more than three times as long as the original complaint and
alleged 21 new causes of action and that the assertion of new claims against
defendants based on the assignment was exactly what [section] 489 was intended to
avoid”); see also Steinitz & Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 141, at
727 n.65 (characterizing the case as “potentially problematic for litigation financiers
regardless of deal structure”).
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information shared by the plaintiffs with their attorneys, but it is
possibly waived if later disclosed to third parties.209 Attorney-work
product doctrine protects the lawyer’s case materials and impressions
of the case from discovery,210 but that protection can fail if materials
are disclosed in a way that risks the information getting into the
hands of a litigant’s opponents.211 Litigation financing firms,
however, need information about the litigation to initially invest and
monitor their investment in the case.212 For this reason, there are
concerns that a lawyer’s communications with litigation financing
firms could risk waiver of the attorney-client privilege if there is not a
“common-interest” between the firm and the plaintiff.213 Like the
champerty doctrine, the application of this “common-interest
exception” to the relationship between funders and the plaintiff is
inconsistent across many jurisdictions.214 However, the doctrine of
209. See COMM’N ON ETHICS, WHITE PAPER, supra note 201, at 35 (stating that
information shared with a person other than a “privileged person” waives the
protection of the attorney client privilege and opens such information up to
discovery). This discovery rule is closely related but separate from the duty of
confidentiality owed by lawyers to their clients. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.6 (2014) (prohibiting a lawyer from disclosing information relating to
representation unless informed consent is obtained, it is implied in order to represent
the client, or an exception applies, such as the potential for risk of harm or death).
210. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A)–(B) (“Ordinarily, a party may not
discover documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative . . . [if] the court
orders discovery of those materials, it must protect against disclosure of the mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party’s attorney or other
representative concerning the litigation.”).
211. See Grace M. Giesel, Alternative Litigation Finance and the Work-Product Doctrine,
47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1083, 1107 (2012) (explaining that disclosure of attorneywork product can waive protection “if the client or lawyer or a representative of
either discloses the materials voluntarily to the adversary or discloses the materials in
a way that substantially increase[s] the opportunities for potential adversaries to
obtain the information” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
212. See Formal Op. 2011-2, supra note 137 (explaining that the risk of waiver of
the attorney-work product doctrine and attorney-client privilege occurs when a
litigation financing firm requests information in its due diligence process or includes
contract provisions that require information or documents to be shared by the lawyer
with the firm). But see Molot, supra note 130, at 186 (recognizing that a “good
funder” will use his own judgment to analyze a case because attorneys “have strong
incentives to paint as rosy a picture of the merits as possible”).
213. See COMM’N ON ETHICS, WHITE PAPER, supra note 201, at 36 (suggesting that a
court may reason that the information is privileged because the funder itself is a
“privileged party” in addition to the attorney and client, or that there is a “common
interest” between the funder and the plaintiff in the litigation’s outcome).
214. See, e.g., Devon It, Inc. v. IBM Corp., No. 10-2899, 2012 WL 4748160, at *1 n.1
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2012) (holding that attorney-client privilege is not waived when
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attorney work product has generally been thought of as providing
greater protection to attorneys sharing their thoughts and materials
regarding an ongoing case with a third-party.215 As such, an attorney
who shares work product with a litigation funder likely does not waive
protection so long as the he enters into a nondisclosure agreement
with the funder and any other parties who receive such information.216
In sum, the current for-profit litigation finance industry provides
little recourse to the public interest organization in its litigation
efforts. As detailed above, this can be seen as an issue of misaligned
incentives: litigation financing firms, motivated by profit and the
shareholder maximization norm, are simply not interested in public
interest litigation that emphasize non-monetary relief and symbolic
victory over large damage awards.217 Additionally, public interest
organizations may shy away from for-profit litigation financing
because the funder’s monetary interests may lead to associated
pressures that do not always align with the organization’s social
impact goals and the plaintiff’s often mixed interests.218 Even when a
case offers a large enough prospect of an award, a litigation financing
firm may still disclaim any interest in non-monetary relief or a
plaintiff’s lawyer provided documents to litigation financing firm because of a
“common interest” between the plaintiff and funder). But see Miller UK Ltd. v.
Caterpillar, Inc., No. 10 C 3770, 2014 WL 67340, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2014)
(finding litigation financing firm, who, “for their part, were interested in profit[s],”
were not in a “common legal interest” with the plaintiffs and that “materials shared
with any actual or prospective funders lost whatever attorney-client privilege they
might otherwise have enjoyed”).
215. See Miller, 2014 WL 67340, at *16 (finding that the application of the attorneyclient privilege and work-product doctrine varies in the case law because the
objective of the attorney-client privilege is to protect communication between the
lawyer and his client while the work product doctrine protects the lawyer’s internal
thoughts and strategy from opposing litigants).
216. See Giesel, supra note 211, at 1087 (concluding that “materials that evaluate
litigation, even if created in the [litigation-finance] setting, are likely protected by
the work-product doctrine” so long as the litigation financing firm “enters into a
binding nondisclosure agreement with regard to any shared materials” and does not
take actions that risk disclosing the information to the opponent in the case). The
Miller court also recently embraced this reasoning. See Miller, 2014 WL 67340, at *18
(suggesting that a “confidentiality agreement may be a sufficient but not a necessary
element of a finding of nonwaiver” of the attorney work-product protection in the
litigation finance context).
217. See supra notes 153–60 and accompanying text (discussing the litigation
financing firms’ incentives are not properly aligned with public interest
organizations due to its strictly for-profit motivations).
218. See supra notes 162–72 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the
type of control that a litigation financing firm may seek over a piece of litigation to
ensure a monetary return).

WILSON.PAGEPROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

LITIGATION FINANCE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST

2/3/2015 8:10 PM

423

fiduciary duty to the plaintiff.219 Lastly, the for-profit industry
operates under some considerable uncertainty because of the uneven
application of the champerty doctrine and lingering questions
regarding attorney-client privilege or the doctrine of attorney work
product.220 The question, then, becomes whether there is a middle
ground between the for-profit and non-profit donor models of
funding public interest litigation, and whether any such solution may
mitigate some of the issues that inhibit the for-profit litigation
finance industry from facilitating access to justice and private
enforcement of the law.
III. SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THE MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN FORPROFIT AND NON-PROFIT SOLUTIONS TO SOCIAL PROBLEMS
Social entrepreneurship is a recent trend developing in the United
States that “tak[es] root in a fertile space between the for-profit and
nonprofit worlds.”221 While the term itself is meant to include any
effort that creates a social benefit,222 it is widely associated with the
critique on for-profit firms that elevate shareholder value over wider
concerns for stakeholders (i.e. customers and employees) and the
environment.223 Finding that corporate responsibility efforts have
largely failed,224 social entrepreneurs employ, inter alia, two strategies
in their effort to widen the concerns of corporate governance and
alleviate social ills—impact investing and social enterprise.225 Impact
investing, as its name implies, is an investment practice whereby
individuals set up “institutional funds [that] take into account
nonfinancial and social benefit considerations when screening
potential investment opportunities by either avoiding companies

219. See supra notes 174–87 and accompanying text (detailing two provisions of a
litigation finance contract between a funder and public interest organization).
220. See supra notes 209–16 and accompanying text (providing a short description
of state of the law of champerty, attorney work-product, and attorney-client privilege
in the context of litigation finance).
221. Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL.
L. REV. 337, 342 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
222. Esposito, supra note 16, at 647.
223. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing the shareholder
maximization norm).
224. See Esposito, supra note 16, at 656 (asserting that corporate responsibility
reporting, which involves third-party certification that the firm is providing social
benefits, “is increasingly recognized for what it is—a public relations tool that pays lip
service to increased corporate transparency but does little, if anything, to alter the
corporate decision-making process”).
225. Id. at 647.
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engaged in socially or environmentally harmful activities or actively
seeking companies engaged in positive pursuits.”226 It may also
include more traditional investors who take greater notice of the
social consequences of the businesses in which they invest,227 or see
investment opportunity in areas once occupied exclusively by nonprofits.228 Regardless, impact investing promises to be a growing
industry in the United States.229
If impact investing refers to the source of socially conscious
financing, social enterprise may well refer to the recipient of such
funding. Specifically, social enterprises are newly formed business
entities that aim to achieve not solely shareholder maximization but
instead “‘double-bottom-line’ (financial and social) or ‘triple bottomline’ (financial, social, and environmental) results.”230 Interestingly,
this move has resulted in large part from the frustrations associated
with the “for-profit/non-profit dichotomy” of today’s business
entities, namely, that for-profit firms are generally expected to
pursue shareholder maximization, and non-profits can have
broader social goals but may not distribute profits to investors. 231
Consequently, state legislatures recently passed a number of laws
that allow for incorporation of social enterprises, including the
flexible benefit corporation, low-profit limited liability company,
and the benefit corporation.232
226. Id. at 647–48.
227. See Briana Cummings, Note, Benefit Corporations: How to Enforce a Mandate to
Promote the Public Interest, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 578, 583, 602–13 (2012) (noting that
traditional investors fearing ramifications of “poor social or environmental
performance, or wanting to promote social change as an end in itself, are
increasingly screening corporations’ nonfinancial performance” (footnotes omitted)).
228. See Antony Bugg-Levine et al., A New Approach to Funding Social Enterprises:
Unbundling Societal Benefits and Financial Returns Can Dramatically Increase Investment,
HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2012, at 3, 4 (“An increasing number of social entrepreneurs
and investors are coming to realize that social enterprises of all sorts can also
generate financial returns that will make them attractive to the right investors.”).
229. See Esposito, supra note 16, at 643–44 (noting a 13% increase in assets backed
by “sustainable” and “socially responsible investing,” as well as an estimated 10 year
profit potential of $183 to $667 billion on these investments); see also Murray, supra
note 15, at 48 (indicating traditional investment firms and high net worth individuals
believe impact investing will grow in the coming years).
230. Kelley, supra note 221, at 339.
231. Esposito, supra note 16, at 644; see also J. William Callison, Putting New Sheets
on a Procrustean Bed: How Benefit Corporations Address Fiduciary Duties, The Dangers
Created, and Suggestions for Change, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 85, 90 (2012) (explaining the
roots of social enterprise lie in the limits of the non-profit solution to social problems).
232. See generally MORRISON FOERSTER & TRUSTLAW CONNECT, WHICH LEGAL
STRUCTURE IS RIGHT FOR MY SOCIAL ENTERPRISE? A GUIDE TO ESTABLISHING A SOCIAL
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The benefit corporation, in particular, illustrates how statutory law
attempts to find a balance between the for-profit and social goals of
social enterprise. State law mandates that a benefit corporation
embrace a public benefit broader than profit-maximization233 but also
permits the entity to earn a monetary return and raise capital like a
traditional corporation.234 The investors may be either traditional
investors or impact investors.235
To ensure that the benefit
corporation does not abrogate its responsibility to pursue a public
benefit, the benefit corporation has two principal features: it
“expands [a director’s] fiduciary duty to require consideration of
nonfinancial interests,”236 and imposes requirements on the corporation
to report on its performance in achieving its public benefit.237
Much of the literature elevates the benefit corporation as offering
the most potential for businesses pursuing a social benefit.238 Not
only is the entity already embraced in a number of states,239 but the
ENTERPRISE IN THE UNITED STATES 76 (2013) (providing an overview of traditional
corporate forms as well as possible social enterprises and hybrid ventures).
233. See generally William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit
Corporations Are Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
817, 839 (2012) (asserting that one of the defining characteristics of a benefit
corporation is the obligation to create a “general public benefit,” which contrasts
with traditional corporations that may “form for any lawful purpose, but have no
explicit purpose requirement”).
234. See Benefit Corp and Nonprofits, BENEFIT CORP INFO. CENTER,
http://benefitcorp.net/what-makes-benefit-corp-different/benefit-corp-andnonprofits (last visited Dec. 21, 2014) (recognizing that while non-profits receive
donations, a benefit corporation allows for equity or debt investment that earns a
return for investors).
235. See William H. Clark, Jr. et al., The Need and Rationale for the Benefit
Corporation: Why It Is the Legal Form That Best Addresses the Needs of Social
Entrepreneurs, Investors, and, Ultimately, the Public 28 (Jan. 18, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://benefitcorp.net/storage/documents/
Benecit_Corporation_White_Paper_1_18_2013.pdf (noting that benefit corporations
can attract capital in the same manner as for-profit corporations, but may also
appeal to the growing community of impact investors looking for a social return
on their investments).
236. Clark & Babson, supra note 233, at 838.
237. See id. at 842 (indicating that benefit corporations require reports on social
performance in order to ensure proper monitoring of directors).
238. See, e.g., Esposito, supra note 16, at 707 (denoting the benefit corporation as
“the most promising entity” because it allows for a “mixture of specifically defined
social or environment corporate purposes, transparency, accountability, flexibility,
and limited liability for social entrepreneurs”). But see Callison, supra note 231, at 92
(arguing that the benefit corporation is inadequate for many corporations and must
be more flexible to accommodate different business strategies).
239. See State by State Legislative Status, BENEFIT CORP INFO. CENTER,
http://www.benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status (last visited Dec. 21, 2014)
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benefit corporation has also followed a relatively uniform approach
due to the organizational efforts of B Lab.240 This non-profit
organization has pushed for states to adopt model legislation as
demand for social enterprises has increased.241 While some have
criticized the limitations of the benefit corporation as laid out in the
Model Benefit Corporation Legislation (the “Model Legislation” or
“Model”),242 this Comment does not delve deeply into this debate.
Instead, it considers how such an entity may help alleviate funding
issues in a specific legal practice. As this Comment charts a path
forward for social entrepreneurs looking to invest in public interest
litigation, a review of the main provisions of the Model Legislation
and the Delaware Public Benefit Corporation is useful.
A. The Benefit Corporation Model Legislation
The Model Legislation makes clear that the benefit corporation is a
status that overlays the traditional for-profit corporation, subject to
the traditional corporate laws of the state adopting its provision.243
To become a benefit corporation, a newly formed corporation
must state in its articles of incorporation that it is a benefit
corporation;244 existing corporations may become a benefit
corporation through an amendment process or by merging with
an existing benefit corporation.245
Central to the Model is the requirement that a benefit corporation,
in addition to fulfilling its purpose under the state’s traditional
incorporation statute, must have the “purpose of creating a general
benefit.”246 This general benefit is broadly defined as a “material
(providing a frequently updated list of the recent states that have embraced the
benefit corporation and those with pending legislation). As of this article, the
benefit corporation has been embraced by twenty-seven states with pending
legislation in thirteen other states. Id.
240. See The Non-Profit Behind B Corps, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/whatare-b-corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps (last visited Dec. 21, 2014). B Lab
describes itself as a “501(c)3 nonprofit that serves a global movement of
entrepreneurs using the power of business to solve social and environmental
problems.” Id. B Lab also has a certification called the B Corporation, which is distinct
from the Model Legislation and the corporate entity embraced by state statues. Id.
241. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION (2012); Callison, supra note 231, at 98
(remarking that state statutes derive from B-Lab’s Model Legislation).
242. See Callison, supra note 231, at 98, 104–05 (discussing the weaknesses of
the B-Lab Model).
243. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 101(c).
244. Id. § 103.
245. Id. § 104.
246. Id. § 201(a).
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positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole,
assessed against a third-party standard, from the business and
operations of a benefit corporation.”247 The Model further provides
an extensive definition as to what constitutes a “third-party
standard.”248 Importantly, in addition to pursuing the required
general benefit, a benefit corporation may elect to include in its
articles of incorporation the identification of “one or more specific
public benefits that it is the purpose of the benefit corporation to
create.”249 These “optional” specific benefits are further defined
under the Model, providing a non-exhaustive list that the benefit
corporation may adopt.250
In an effort to ensure the benefit corporation carries out its
general and specific benefit, the Model mandates that the board of
directors, committees, and individual officers “shall consider the
effects of any action or inaction” on not only the interests of
shareholders of the benefit corporation, but also various
stakeholders—including the customers as “beneficiaries of the
general public benefit or specific public benefit,” the environment,
the community in which the business is located, and the employees of
the company.251 Directors who fail to create the general benefit
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id. § 102.
Id.
Id. § 201(b).
Id. § 102. The Model’s possible specific benefits include:
(1) providing low-income or underserved individuals or communities
with beneficial products or services; (2) promoting economic
opportunity for individuals or communities beyond the creation of jobs
in the normal course of business; (3) protecting or restoring the
environment; (4) improving human health; (5) promoting the arts,
sciences, or advancement of knowledge; (6) increasing the flow of
capital to entities with a purpose to benefit society or the environment;
and (7) conferring any other particular benefit on society or the
environment.

Id.
251. Id. § 301(a)(1) (emphasis added). The specific language of the statute states
that the director must consider:
(i) the shareholders of the benefit corporation; (ii) the employees and
work force of the benefit corporation, its subsidiaries, and its suppliers;
(iii) the interests of customers as beneficiaries of the general public
benefit or specific public benefit purposes of the benefit corporation;
(iv) community and societal factors, including those of each community
in which offices or facilities of the benefit corporation, its subsidiaries, or
its suppliers are located; (v) the local and global environment; (vi) the
short-term and long-term interests of the benefit corporation, including
benefits that may accrue to the benefit corporation from its long-term
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cannot incur any monetary liability,252 and there is an explicit provision
stating that directors have no duty to any person that may be a
beneficiary of the general or opted-in specific benefits.253 Moreover,
the duty to consider various stakeholders and their interests is subject
to the protection of the business judgment rule.254
Nevertheless, the Act also sets out to modify the fiduciary duties
owed by a director, explicitly stating that consideration of the general
or specific benefits does not constitute a violation of those duties
owed to the corporation and shareholders.255 These provisions are
essential, as they ensure “directors who consider the enumerated
factors are insulated from shareholder claims that they breached
their fiduciary duties by not acting to maximize shareholder
benefit.”256 Additionally, the Model also allows for a “benefit
enforcement proceeding,”257 providing that a shareholder may “bring
a legal action on the basis that the director failed to pursue the stated
general or specific public benefits, failed to consider the interests of
the various stakeholders set forth in the statute, or failed to meet the
plans and the possibility that these interests may be best served by the
continued independence of the benefit corporation; and (vii) the ability
of the benefit corporation to accomplish its general public benefit
purpose and any specific public benefit purpose.
Id.
252. Id. § 301(c). This allows for injunctive relief to still be brought against the
individual director. See Clark & Babson, supra note 233, at 848–49 (discussing how
monetary liability was restricted due to the difficulty in monetizing general and
specific benefits and “to focus courts on the exclusive remedy of awarding injunctive
relief wherein the benefit corporation would be required to simply live up to the
commitments it voluntarily undertook”).
253. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 301(d) (“A director does not have a duty
to a person that is a beneficiary of the general public benefit purpose or a specific
public benefit purpose of a benefit corporation arising from the status of the person
as a beneficiary.”).
254. Id. § 301(e) (“A director who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills
the duty under this section if the director: (1) is not interested in the subject of the
business judgment; (2) is informed with respect to the subject of the business
judgment to the extent the director reasonably believes to be appropriate under the
circumstances; and (3) rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best
interests of the benefit corporation.”).
255. Id. § 301(b)(1).
256. Callison, supra note 231, at 96.
257. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 305(a) (“Except in a benefit
enforcement proceeding, no person may bring an action or assert a claim against a
benefit corporation or its directors or officers with respect to: (1) failure to pursue
or create general public benefit or a specific public benefit set forth in its articles
of incorporation; or (2) violation of an obligation, duty, or standard of conduct
under this [chapter].”).
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transparency requirements in the statute.”258 While a stakeholder, such
as a customer or client of the benefit corporation, has no ability to
bring a benefit enforcement proceeding against a director for failing
to effectuate the corporation’s stated purpose,259 shareholders
nevertheless have the right to bring an enforcement proceeding on
the basis that a stakeholder’s interests are not being considered.260
Lastly, a director is also required to assemble an annual public
benefit report that details how the benefit corporation’s general or
specific benefits were created, how the third-party standard was met,
and the ways in which the corporation fell short of its goal.261 This
report must be made available to the public.262
B. The Delaware Public Benefit Corporation Statute
On July 17, 2013, Governor Jack Markell signed a law authorizing
creation of the “public benefit corporations” (“PBCs”) in Delaware.263
At its core, the Delaware PBC has many of the same features as the
benefit corporation under the Model put forth by B Lab.264 Just as
the Model requires the benefit corporation to pursue a “general
258. Clark & Babson, supra note 233, at 849–50.
259. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 305(c) (limiting standing in a benefit
enforcement proceeding to shareholders, directors, officers and those stated in the
corporation’s bylaws).
260. See Clark & Babson, supra note 233, at 850 (stating that the Model provides
that shareholder can “bring an action for failure to consider other stakeholder
interests (e.g., for failure of the directors to adequately consider the impact of a
particular action on the workforce of the company)”); Esposito, supra note 16, at 700
(discussing how a benefit corporation’s stakeholders have no right to sue but that
“shareholders of benefit corporations are given an expanded right of action to
enforce [the] additional duty to consider stakeholder interests”). For a particularly
interesting viewpoint of these provisions, see Ian Kanig, Note, Sustainable Capitalism
Through the Benefit Corporation: Enforcing the Procedural Duty of Consideration to Protect
Non-Shareholder Interests, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 863, 898–99 (2013) (arguing that the
benefit enforcement proceeding is a substantive guarantee because a director’s
business decisions can be challenged, but also a procedural guarantee, “in the sense
that the board of directors must make some affirmative, evidentiary showing of nonshareholder consideration for all material decisions when challenged in a benefit
enforcement proceeding”).
261. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 401(a)(1)–(2).
262. Id. § 402(b).
263. Daniel Fisher, Delaware “Public Benefit Corporation” Lets Directors Serve Three
Masters Instead of One, FORBES (July 16, 2013, 2:06 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
danielfisher/2013/07/16/delaware-public-benefit-corporation-lets-directors-servethree-masters-instead-of-one.
264. For a more detailed comparison, see Specifics on Delaware Benefit Corporation
Legislation, BENEFIT CORP INFO. CENTER, http://benefitcorp.net/storage/documents/
Delaware_Public_Benefit_Legislation_Specifics.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2014).
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benefit,” a Delaware PBC is “intended to produce a public benefit”
and “to operate in a responsible and sustainable manner.”265
The Delaware PBC, however, differs in a number of respects. First,
it requires the benefit corporation to identify in its certificate of
incorporation one or more specific benefits that it seeks to promote.266
This potentially provides greater specificity for shareholders who
invest in the company and want to enforce the social purpose of the
enterprise.267
Second, the Delaware PBC strips the benefit
corporation of the heavily criticized mandatory third-party standard
requirements,268 allowing the PBC to simply opt for third-party
assessment in the certificate of incorporation or by-laws if it so
chooses.269 Likewise, the biennial benefit report is not required to be
public or evaluated by any third party standard; it is provided only to
shareholders of the corporation.270 Lastly, the PBC, unlike the

265. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (2013).
266. Id. § 362(a)(1) (stating that the corporation must “[i]dentify within its
statement of business or purpose . . . 1 or more specific public benefits to be
promoted by the corporation” (emphasis added)). Additionally, the statute defines a
public benefit as a “positive effect (or reduction of negative effects) on 1 or more
categories of persons, entities, communities or interests (other than stockholders in
their capacities as stockholders) including, but not limited to, effects of an artistic,
charitable, cultural, economic, educational, environmental, literary, medical,
religious, scientific or technological nature.” Id. § 362(b).
267. See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out: Who’s
Opting In?, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 256), available at
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2351&context=f
acpub (noting that the requirement of the public benefit corporation to declare a
specific benefit “give[s] shareholders control over the mission of the public benefit
corporation and focus directors on a contractually agreed upon public benefit”).
268. See Callison, supra note 231, at 94 (explaining that while “[t]he Model spills
much ink attempting to define each of these characteristics [of the third-party
standard], . . . it does not prescribe any content for the standards, . . . [t]hus, it is
conceivable that some third-party standard-setters will establish very low, but
transparent, standards for benefit corporations and the whole concept of public
good will go down the greenwash drain”).
269. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(c)(2)–(3).
270. Id. § 366(b)–(c). Specifically, the statement should include:
(1) The objectives the board of directors has established to promote
such public benefit or public benefits and interests;
(2) The standards the board of directors has adopted to measure the
corporation’s progress in promoting such public benefit or public
benefits and interests;
(3) Objective factual information based on those standards regarding
the corporation’s success in meeting the objectives for promoting such
public benefit or public benefits and interests; and
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Model, is required to feature the acronym in its name271 and clearly
indicate it is a PBC in any notices or stock certificates to shareholders.272
The Delaware PBC preserves the flexibility of directors to pursue a
social purpose, but has a somewhat different approach to holding
directors accountable for a failure to pursue a public benefit. Like
the Model, the Delaware PBC limits the director’s liability for failing
to create specific benefits, imposes no duties on the director to the
broader stakeholders in any such benefits, and allows for the business
judgment rule to protect the director’s decisions.273 Importantly,
section 365(a) of the Delaware PBC statute also modifies the duties of
directors by requiring the corporation to be managed “in a manner
that balances the pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best
interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct,
and the specific public benefit or public benefits identified in its
certificate of incorporation.”274
This resembles the Model
Legislation’s provisions regarding a director’s duties,275 allowing the
director a degree of freedom to obviate any duty to maximize
(4) An assessment of the corporation’s success in meeting the objectives
and promoting such public benefit or public benefits and interests.
Id. § 366(b).
271. Id. § 362(c) (“The name of the public benefit corporation shall, without
exception, contain the words ‘public benefit corporation,’ or the abbreviation
‘P.B.C.,’ or the designation ‘PBC,’ which shall be deemed to satisfy the requirements
of § 102(a)(1)(i) of this title.”).
272. Id. § 364 (“Any stock certificate issued by a public benefit corporation shall
note conspicuously that the corporation is a public benefit corporation formed
pursuant to this subchapter.”).
273. Id. § 365(b) (stating that a director’s decision “implicating the balance
requirement” satisfies the “director’s fiduciary duties to stockholders and the
corporation if such director’s decision is both informed and disinterested and not
such that no person of ordinary, sound judgment would approve”). Additionally, the
PBC’s certificate of incorporation may opt into a provision that “any disinterested
failure to satisfy . . . section [365] shall not . . . constitute an act or omission not in
good faith, or a breach of the duty of loyalty.” Id. § 365(c).
274. Id. § 365(a) (emphasis added). This language may be stronger than the
language used in the Model and may require more of directors. See Cass Brewer,
Preliminary Observations Concerning Delaware’s New Benefit Corporation Act, SOCENTLAW
(July 19, 2013), http://socentlaw.com/2013/07/preliminary-observations-concerningdelawares-new-benefit-corporation-act (“Delaware require[s] the directors of a
benefit corporation to ‘balance’ the pecuniary interests of the shareholders with the
other interests of nonshareholders, whereas the B-Lab mockup only requires
‘consideration’ of nonshareholder interests. Only time will tell, but the practical
difference between ‘balancing’ versus merely ‘considering’ nonshareholder interests
could be tremendous.”).
275. See supra note 251 and accompanying text (providing the statutory text
obligating a director to consider stakeholder interests).
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shareholder value.276 However, the Delaware law does not embrace
the Model’s “benefit enforcement proceeding,” but instead allows
shareholders to maintain a derivative suit to enforce section 365(a)
of the Act.277 Thus, when a corporation opts to become a PBC, a
shareholder looking to enforce the specific benefit in the public
benefit corporation’s certificate of incorporation may bring a
derivative proceeding to force the corporation to follow its stated
social purpose.278
IV. THE LEGAL FEASIBILITY AND POLICY BENEFITS OF A SOCIAL
ENTERPRISE MODEL OF FINANCING PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION
This Comment presents an alternative, social enterprise model of
funding public interest litigation whereby a litigation financing firm
organizes as a benefit corporation to provide funding to public
interest organizations’ litigation efforts in exchange for a share in any
monetary award or settlement. The adoption of this social enterprise
model is legally feasible and addresses a number of the seemingly
distinct trends outlined above. Specifically, the model expands
financing for public interest organizations that are currently
underfunded in their efforts to provide access to justice and enforce
private rights of action; mitigates many of the ethical and legal issues
facing the litigation financing industry, while also bringing its
benefits to public interest organizations; and allows social
entrepreneurs to pursue their goals in the judicial arena while
making a modest return on their investment.
This section will proceed in three parts. First, a hypothetical model
is provided to illustrate how a litigation financing firm organized as a
social enterprise is a legally feasible alternative to the non-profit and
276. See Plerhoples, supra note 267, at 256 (asserting that a director, in an effort to
shield himself from a derivative suit by shareholders, may argue “that such a broad
balancing requirement [in 365(a)] encompasses many interests (even those that
conflict with shareholders’ monetary interests) and any public benefit” regardless of
the one specified in the company’s charter).
277. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 367 (providing that the “[s]tockholders of a public
benefit corporation owning individually or collectively, as of the date of instituting
such derivative suit, at least 2% of the corporation’s outstanding shares or, in the
case of a corporation with shares listed on a national securities exchange, the lesser
of such percentage or shares of at least $2,000,000 in market value, may maintain a
derivative lawsuit to enforce the requirements set forth in § 365(a) of this title”).
278. See Plerhoples, supra note 267, at 257 (noting that “the Delaware statute does
not reference any separate procedure. This might imply that a derivative lawsuit is
the appropriate action against the directors of a public benefit corporation for
failure to pursue a public benefit”).
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for-profit models of financing public interest litigation. Particular
attention is focused on how a litigation financing firm can
incorporate as a benefit corporation to carry out (and enforce) its
purpose to finance public interest litigation. Second, it will examine
the Delaware PBC statute and its advantages for parties devoted to
financing public interest litigation. Third, it will explore the public
policy benefits by illustrating how the social enterprise model
ameliorates some of the legal issues that currently prevent the
broader for-profit litigation financing industry from facilitating
greater access to justice and private enforcement of the law.
A. Public Interest Litigation Financing as a Social Enterprise Model
Given the limits of the non-profit and for-profit models to provide
litigation financing to public interest organizations, a social
entrepreneur should instead turn to a social enterprise that broadens
the current sources of funding for public interest organizations, yet
minimizes the problems associated with a purely profit-oriented
approach to litigation financing. This arrangement could be set up
as follows. A social entrepreneur organizes and incorporates a closely
held,279 litigation financing firm as a benefit corporation with the
specific purpose of investing in litigation brought by public interest
organizations.280 In turn, this funder attracts capital from the

279. A closely held corporation is “[a] corporation whose stock is not freely traded
and is held by only a few shareholders.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 391 (9th ed. 2009).
For our purposes here, the envisioned entity will be thought of as a closely held
because such corporations are often more suitable for achieving the goals of social
enterprises. See Callison, supra note 231, at 102 (asserting that most benefit
corporations will be closely held because “[i]t seems relatively unlikely that larger
corporations, in which shareholders do not share familial or personal connection,
will comprise a large proportion of the corporations seeking to enable values other
than shareholder profit-maximization”).
280. The Delaware PBC statute requires identification of the specific public benefit
promoted by the corporation in the certificate of incorporation. See supra note 266
and accompanying text (providing the statutory language). Therefore, the litigation
financing firm’s certificate of incorporation should state that it is a public benefit
corporation and identify the specific purpose of providing funding to non-profit,
public interest organizations’ litigation efforts. Under the statutory language, this
public benefit would be a “positive effect” on “entities” of an “economic . . . nature.”
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(b). More specifically, the language in the certificate of
incorporation could be written as the following:
In an effort to support legal efforts that promote access to justice, the
directors of [name of benefit corporation] PBC, after a due diligence
process, shall establish, as a specific benefit, litigation financing contracts
with plaintiffs represented by non-profit, public-interest organizations
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growing community of impact investors, high net worth individuals,
and other traditional investment firms looking to make both
monetary and social returns on their investments.281 The benefit
corporation, as required by its stated specific benefit, then generates
this social return by entering into litigation financing contracts with
public interest organizations and their clients who bring impact
litigation cases, many of which involve the civil rights, environmental,
human rights, and employment discrimination areas of the law;
importantly, these cases will often feature a private right of action
that seeks non-monetary and monetary relief for not only litigants,
but also society as a whole.282 In return for financing, the benefit
corporation receives a share in any monetary relief awarded in the
litigation effort.283 This return is then distributed to the shareholders
of the benefit corporation or any other investors in the litigation,284
along with the added “reputational capital” that comes with
supporting a public interest organization’s pursuit of non-monetary

who have filed class or individual actions on behalf of litigants in the civil
rights, environmental, or employment discrimination areas of the law.
This language could be narrowed or broadened depending on the expertise of the
litigation financing firm and the type of litigation funded. While outside the scope
of this paper, the language could also be modified to include public interest law firms
and other organizations involved in impact litigation. See supra note 5 (distinguishing
public interest organizations from a broader “cause lawyering” movement).
281. See supra notes 225–29 and accompanying text (noting the growing “impact
investment” community looking for a social return on their monetary investments, as
well as traditional investors that are becoming more interested in such opportunities).
282. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text (describing the various areas of
the law in which a private action is often authorized).
283. See supra note 126 (detailing the process by which litigation financing firms
establish contracts with plaintiffs in return for a share of any eventual award).
284. Certainly, some public interest cases may not generate the same size damage
awards seen in commercial litigation currently funded by litigation financing firms,
which could result in less of a return for traditional investors in the firm. However,
social enterprise models attempt to ensure more competitive returns for traditional
investors by carving out a role for foundational grants to subsidize the investment.
See infra note 294 (proposing litigation financing firms adopt a new model of
financing social enterprise). Additionally, the litigation financing firm could
contribute its own capital to finance a profitable case, earn a return on its
investment, and then put those funds towards cases that may make more of a visible
impact but offer less of a monetary return—a strategy currently utilized by for-profit
public interest law firms. See supra note 85 (discussing how public interest law firms
afford to take on cause-oriented, less profitable cases). These public interest law
firms, however, cannot tap into outside investment if the state in which it resides adopts
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct’s prohibition against forming legal
partnerships with nonlawyers. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b) (2013).
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relief and broader social impact.285 This basic model is illustrated in
Diagram A in the Appendix.
Importantly, the public interest organization will likely maintain its
non-profit status under this arrangement while also experiencing an
increased capacity in its clients to pay for services. Public interest
organizations often incorporate as non-profits to obtain tax-exempt
status.286 Per IRS rules, non-profits engaging in litigation may accept
attorneys’ fees only if “paid directly by its clients.”287 Indeed, if a
litigation financing firm were to contract with a public interest
organization to cover its fees in a case, this provision would likely
pose an obstacle. However, litigation financing firms already contract
“directly” with clients, who in turn put the advanced funds toward
obtaining legal representation.288 In the social enterprise model,
much of the same arrangement plays out—the benefit corporation
provides the funds to the client in exchange for a share in any
monetary recovery; the client then uses these funds to hire a public
interest organization on retainer, with any balance being refunded
once the litigation is complete.289 In this fashion, the public interest
organization is paid directly by the client and the client gains greater
access to justice.
Perhaps more importantly, the IRS requires public interest
organizations to decline cases in which the client has a “sufficient
285. See Coffee, Litigation Governance, supra note 158, at 346–48 (proposing
“nonentrepreneurial model” of “litigation governance” for class action cases in
Europe whereby instead of relying on a contingent fee arrangement, a public
interest organization serves as lead plaintiff staking its “reputational capital” on the
outcome of the case while negotiating with litigation financing firms).
286. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (explaining that public interest
organizations often organize as 501(c)(3) organizations to achieve tax-exempt status).
287. Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-2 C.B. 411, § 4.02. This section also allows fees to be
paid “by opposing parties [if the fees] are awarded by a court or administrative
agency.” Id. § 4.01.
288. See Steinitz, Whose Claim, supra note 132, at 1291–92 (noting that litigation
financing firms often contract directly with the client, as opposed to the client’s
lawyer, in order to avoid implicating the ethical prohibition on splitting fees with
non-lawyers). In much the same way, this caution carries over and protects the nonprofit’s tax exempt status.
289. The IRS rules governing public interest organizations already allow for such
an arrangement. See Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-2 C.B. 411, § 5.01 (stating that attorneys’
fees “may be charged against a retainer, with any balance remaining after the
conclusion of litigation refunded to the litigant”). Nevertheless, any fees charged
must not “exceed the actual cost incurred in each case, viz., the salaries, overhead,
and other costs fairly allocable to the litigation in question.” Id. Additionally, the IRS
requires that all attorneys’ fees collected over a five-year period “must not exceed 50
percent of the total cost of operation of the organization's legal functions.” Id. § 4.05.
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commercial or financial interest in the outcome of the litigation to
justify retention of a private law firm.”290 Arguably, the presence of a
strictly for-profit litigation financing firm would indeed indicate that
the client has a “sufficient commercial or financial interest” in the
outcome to justify private legal representation. However, if a benefit
corporation—an entity required to balance pecuniary and social
interests291—provides the funding, the public interest organization is
all the more justified in believing the client lacks the purely financial
or commercial interests that would otherwise justify private legal
representation. In fact, the IRS has considerable leeway to take
account of such factors.292
Likewise, the social enterprise model does not involve a dramatic
reworking of the funding mechanisms already financing public
interest litigation. Rather, it broadens the pool of capital to include
impact investors and traditional investors while preserving an
important role for foundations’ philanthropy. Under this framework,
the foundations continue to provide grants to the public interest
organizations, just as the Rosenberg Foundation did in Dukes.293
However, these grants will now act as subsidies to the impact
investors, high net-worth individuals, and traditional investors who
provide capital to the litigation financing firm and expect both a
social and monetary return on their investment.294 In other words,

290. Id. § 4.04. However, in situations where a client does have a “sufficient
financial interest” to justify private representation, the public interest organization
may “in cases of sufficient broad public interest, represent the public interest as
amicus curiae or intervenor.” Id.
291. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (2014) (requiring “a public benefit
corporation shall be managed in a manner that balances the stockholders’ pecuniary
interests, the best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct,
and the public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation”).
292. See Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-2 C.B. 411, § 1 (stating that “[t]hese guidelines are
not inflexible and an organization will be given the opportunity to demonstrate that
under the facts and circumstances of its particular program, adherence to the
guidelines is not required in certain respects in order to ensure that the operations
are totally charitable”).
293. See supra notes 97–104 and accompanying text (explaining that Rosenberg’s
support of the impact litigation effort included grants and a program-related
investment to the public interest organization bringing the case); see also supra notes
93–94 and accompanying text (noting that most of public interest organizations’
current support comes from foundations’ grants and other philanthropic efforts).
294. See Bugg-Levine et al., supra note 228, at 4 (providing a social enterprise
model that seeks to attract investment from investors to organizations with a social
purpose). Importantly, Bugg-Levine et al. advocate a model of financing social
enterprise that specifically carves out a continued role for foundations:
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the foundations’ grants make it “worth it” for conventional investors.
Likewise, a litigation financing firm could follow a similar contractual
arrangement as the one advocated for by Professor Steinitz in the forprofit industry: the litigation financing firm serves as a general
corporate partner that manages funds in a limited partnership with
passive investors, earning a small fee for assembling the capital and
entering into litigation finance contracts on behalf of the fund.295
However, in the social enterprise model, the general partner is a
litigation financing firm organized as a benefit corporation with an
expertise in financing public interest litigation, and the limited
partners would not only be traditional investors looking to make a
monetary return but also impact investors seeking a social return on a
specific case or portfolio of cases.296 This arrangement is illustrated
in Diagram B in the Appendix.
The donor [such as a foundation] does not expect to get its money back;
it expects its money to generate a social benefit. It considers the
investment a failure only if that social benefit is not created. . . . [W]ith
a donor-investor willing to subsidize half the cost, the social enterprise
becomes valuable and less risky to conventional investors.
The
traditional model of social enterprise leaves this value on the table.
Donors lose out because they fully subsidize a project that could have
attracted investment capital, and investors do not participate at all. . . .
In the emerging model of social enterprise capital markets, donors play
the role of equity holders, providing capital that supports an enterprise
and that makes the debt taken on by financial investors safer, with
better expected returns.
Id. at 5. This model of social enterprise can be adopted to litigation finance to
similarly ensure higher returns for traditional investors, many of whom are becoming
increasingly interested in litigation finance due to the potential for extraordinarily
high returns. See Alden, supra note 129 (explaining that a new litigation financing
firm has raised capital “from investors like public pension funds, university
endowments and family offices”). Public interest litigation may not offer as high a
return to these investors as commercial cases. However, if the foundations continue
to provide donations to fund public interest litigation (as they currently do), then
they effectively subsidize the investment for traditional investors and ensure a higher
return than would otherwise be the case; this, in turn, broadens the pool of capital
available to the public interest organization in much the same way as discussed by
Bugg-Levine et al.
295. See supra notes 142–47 and accompanying text (summarizing Professor
Steinitz’s litigation finance arrangement modeled after venture capital firms).
296. This sets up two levels of capital derived from potential investors in the firm,
which strongly contrasts with the non-profit form’s inability to make distributions to
investors. See supra note 115 (explaining restrictions on non-profits). Essentially,
those who are interested in the litigation financing firm for its potential to finance
public interest litigation could be the shareholders in the firm (and most likely the
directors and officers). The “second level” of investment would then be in the form
of the limited partnership arrangements advocated for by Professor Steinitz. See
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Employing this social enterprise model resolves a number of the
disadvantages present in the non-profit and for-profit models of
financing public interest organizations and their litigation efforts. As
laid out in Part II.B, the for-profit model has provided little financing
assistance to public interest organizations as it is strictly motivated by
profit-maximization; it has little to gain from generating social
returns for its investors.297 Meanwhile, the non-profit donor model of
funding public interest litigation is strictly regulated, limited in
available capital, and without the expertise and devoted interest in
funding public interest cases.298 The social enterprise model attempts
to resolve these issues by providing a middle ground that moderates
the for-profit model’s shareholder maximization norm while
preserving the non-profit model’s goal of achieving a social benefit.
More particularly, a director of a benefit corporation, under both
the Model Legislation and the Delaware PBC, is mandated (and
empowered) to consider the effect of his decisions on not only
shareholders, but also on customers and beneficiaries of the benefit
corporation’s stated general and specific benefits.299 For this reason,
a director of a litigation financing firm organized as a benefit
corporation would not be required to strictly adhere to the profitmaximization norm that pervades the for-profit litigation finance
industry.300 Instead, the director would be free to consider the
ramifications of the corporation’s actions on the beneficiaries of its
financing—the public interest organizations and the individual
claimholders—as well as the broader potential for social impact.301
This also ensures that the litigation financing firm’s incentives better

supra notes 142–47 and accompanying text (discussing a limited-partnership
arrangement to be used by for-profit firms).
297. See supra notes 150–52 and accompanying text (explaining the access-tojustice and private enforcement rationale for litigation finance but how the industry
has come up short by providing financing only to sophisticated parties).
298. See supra notes 115–21 and accompanying text (discussing the limits of the
non-profit model of financing public interest litigation).
299. See supra notes 251, 274 and accompanying text (providing the statutory text
that lessens the obligation on directors to solely consider shareholder value).
300. See supra notes 153–55 and accompanying text (discussing how for-profit
litigation financing firms are incentivized to maximize profits for investors).
301. See supra note 276 and accompanying text (explaining how the benefit
corporation provisions may be used by a director to defend himself in a derivative
suit challenging his decisions).
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align with the plaintiffs and the public interest organization than in
the for-profit context.302
The social enterprise model also offers unique advantages over the
non-profit donor model of financing cases. First, the benefit
corporation is not organized as a non-profit, so shareholders would
be free to receive distributions and partake in the equity growth of
the organization.303 As a result, the enterprise is open to funding
from the impact investment community and further serves to expand
the potential pool of capital for financing a public interest
organization’s litigation efforts.304 Second, the benefit corporation
would be free to make an investment in the litigation in much the
same fashion as the Rosenberg Foundation did in Dukes, but without
the burden of satisfying the onerous program-related investment
rules.305 Lastly, the benefit corporation, due to its specific benefit,
will be uniquely focused on providing funding for public interest
litigation, allowing it to build up a reputation as a specialized firm in
this area.306 Consequently, the benefit corporation would have a
tremendous advantage over foundations that often do not have the
302. See infra Part IV.C.1 (contending that a benefit corporation’s dual mandate to
consider profits and social benefit is more compatible with balancing the interests of
investors and its funded plaintiffs).
303. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the
distribution restrictions placed on non-profits that prohibit equity investment and
require all earnings remain in the non-profit).
304. See supra notes 225–28 and accompanying text (noting the growing
community of impact investors who primarily seek a social return on their
investment, as well as the traditional investors who, as a secondary consideration, are
increasingly looking for socially beneficial investments).
305. See supra notes 108–14 and accompanying text (reviewing the laws governing
program-related investments by foundations and the difficulty in ensuring such
investments do not run afoul of the IRS’s guidance).
306. See Steinitz, Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 142, at 498–99 (arguing that
the law should facilitate a litigation financing firm’s “noncash contributions” that
lessen the risk inherent in litigation finance). Further, Professor Steinitz argues that
the firm’s principals, many of which will be lawyers, may exercise their expertise in
making investment decisions into certain cases for traditional investors who are
unfamiliar with the nuances of litigation. Id. In the public interest context, we can
imagine a litigation financing firm providing ample “noncash contributions” to the
public interest organization, especially when considering that impact litigation
efforts often have to be coordinated with broader legislative efforts and public
relation campaigns. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (noting that public
interest law is no longer focused strictly on litigation). Additionally, the firm may be
able to channel connections to foundations, thereby lessening the burden and
expense that foundations currently accrue in maintaining these valuable
relationships. This would offer a competitive advantage over current for-profit
financing firms.
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expertise, focus, or desire for the nuances of investing in an impact
litigation effort.307
Finally, this model also addresses an issue that was laid out in the
very beginning of this Comment: public interest organizations often
represent plaintiffs exercising a private right of action, but if they fail
to become a “prevailing party” because of a voluntary change in
conduct by the defendant, they do not earn an award of attorneys’
fees.308 Here, however, the litigation financing firm would advance
the costs of attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff who then uses those funds
to engage the public interest organization’s representation,309
lessening the “chilling effect” that Buckhannon had on public interest
litigation as a whole.310 In other words, establishing a litigation financing
firm in the public interest field may have the potential to support not
only access to justice but also private enforcement of the law.
B. The Advantages of the Delaware Public Benefit Corporation
As detailed in Part III, Delaware authorizes the incorporation of
public benefit corporations that closely follow the business form
established in B Lab’s Model Legislation.311 However, the Delaware
PBC statute and Delaware corporate law provides a number of crucial
advantages over the Model Legislation for a litigation financing firm
funding public interest litigation.312
1.

The specific benefit as an enforcement mechanism
As a Delaware PBC, the litigation financing firm would be required
to provide a specific public benefit in its certificate of
incorporation,313 as opposed to merely the tenuous and broadly

307. See supra notes 119–20 and accompanying text (discussing survey findings
indicating that foundations prefer other philanthropic efforts over litigation and lack
the expertise and patience necessary to fund controversial cases).
308. See supra Part I.C (explaining the ramifications of the Buckhannon ruling).
309. See supra note 81 (providing an example of the impact that Buckhannon had
on a public interest organization’s ability to recoup fees after expending
considerable time and effort in a case).
310. See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text (noting that public interest
organizations reported negative impacts after the Supreme Court’s Buckhannon decision).
311. See supra notes 240–41 and accompanying text (stating that the various state
laws are based on the benefit corporation model promulgated by B Lab, a non-profit
devoted to encouraging adoption of the benefit corporation form).
312. See supra Part III.B (outlining the benefits of the Delaware public benefit
corporation statute over the Model Legislation).
313. See supra note 266 and accompanying text (providing the statutory text that
mandates use of a specific benefit within the contours of certain parameters).
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defined general benefit found in the Model Legislation.314 Given that
the envisioned entity must attract investment from the impact
investor and the traditional investment community, delineating a
specific benefit establishes agreement between the firm and its
shareholders or investors that the firm will finance public interest
litigation.315 Alternatively, if the litigation financing firm organized as
a benefit corporation under the Model Legislation, it would be
required only to set out a “general benefit” that provides little
reassurance to investors and shareholders that the corporation will
pursue its social purpose of financing public interest litigation.316
The requirement that the corporation follow a specific benefit also
provides greater enforceability of the benefit corporation’s purpose
to invest in public interest litigation. Importantly, the Delaware Law
allows for a derivative suit against directors who fail to balance “the
best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s
conduct [with] the specific public benefit or public benefits identified in
its certificate of incorporation.”317 In this context, a shareholder of
the litigation financing firm would have grounds to argue that
directors who pursue cases wholly outside of the public interest area
have not balanced the shareholders’ interests with the specific public
benefit identified in the certificate of incorporation.318 Injunctive
relief could then follow.319 A more likely scenario may arise when the
benefit corporation funds a case that offers a lesser return to its
shareholders and investors but a greater benefit to the public interest
organization and the plaintiff; for example, a case may settle for nonmonetary relief instead of a large monetary award. Likewise, the
directors may decide not to issue a dividend on earnings but instead
fund cases that are less profitable but more impactful. In those type
of situations, the directors may defend their decision-making by
arguing that under the Delaware PBC statute they are not required
314. See supra note 247 and accompanying text (stating the broad statutory text of
the Model Code defining a “public benefit”).
315. See supra note 267 and accompanying text (explaining that the required
specific benefit provides greater specificity for shareholders looking to enforce
the social purpose).
316. See supra notes 246, 249 and accompanying text (noting while a benefit
corporation is obligated to embrace the general benefit that it will act in a
responsible manner, any specific benefits are optional).
317. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (2014) (emphasis added).
318. See supra note 267 and accompanying text (finding that the provisions of the
Delaware PBC provide greater specificity for shareholders to enforce the social mission).
319. Cf. supra note 252 (noting that the language of the Model Legislation limits
the liability of directors to injunctive relief).
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to solely consider the shareholder’s monetary interests but may also
take into account the interests of the plaintiffs funded by the
benefit corporation.320
Likewise, if the directors fail to issue the required benefit report
indicating how the corporation is fulfilling its purpose to invest in
public interest litigation,321 the shareholders could file a derivative
suit to force the directors to produce such a report.322 In sum, the
statutory requirement that a Delaware PBC embrace specific benefit
provides greater accountability, as well as a degree of freedom for
directors in financing public interest litigation.
2.

Signaling
The Delaware PBC, unlike the Model Legislation, requires the
corporation to affix the acronym “PBC” in its name and to state that
it is incorporated as a PBC in any stock certificates or notices.323 By
attaching the PBC acronym to its title, the litigation financing firm
would signal to public interest organizations that the entity has a
social purpose. Furthermore, by affixing a notice to stock certificates,
traditional investors are on notice that the corporation is not strictly
following the shareholder maximization norm. Likewise, impact
investors are drawn to the investment because it indicates that the
litigation financing firm seeks social, as well as monetary benefits.
3.

Optional third-party assessment
Another advantage in organizing the litigation financing firm as a
Delaware PBC would be avoidance of any third-party assessment. As
discussed above, the Model Legislation requires benefit corporations
to embrace a third-party standard that verifies whether a public
benefit is being pursued.324 Such a requirement would be particularly

320. See supra note 276 and accompanying text (explaining that, like the Model
Legislation, the Delaware PBC allows a director to exercise duties more freely by
considering factors outside of shareholder value).
321. See supra note 270 (providing the statutory text of the Delaware PBC
requiring the board of directors provide a detailed statement on how the corporation
promotes the public benefit identified in its certificate of incorporation).
322. See supra note 260 (discussing how, in the context of the Model Legislation, a
benefit report places informal constraints on directors to follow the social mission of
the benefit corporation). Much of the same would apply to the Delaware PBC, with
the added benefit of greater specificity.
323. See supra notes 271–72 (providing the statutory text).
324. See supra notes 247–48 and accompanying text (providing statutory text that
obligates a benefit corporation under the Model Legislation to assess any public
benefit against a third-party standard).
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onerous for a litigation financing firm because it may obtain vital
information about ongoing litigation in its due diligence process as it
oversees additional funding for the case.325 Current case law suggests
that a plaintiff’s disclosure of such information to a litigation
financing firm could constitute a waiver of the attorney-client
privilege if there is no “common interest” between the third-party
financing firm and the plaintiff.326
Undoubtedly, a litigation
financing firm may receive a number of sensitive documents, ranging
from the attorney’s thoughts on a case’s prospect for success to
discussion with the plaintiff on a strategy for settlement talks.327 If an
industry watchdog disclosed such information through third-party
assessment in an effort to verify that the benefit corporation is
fulfilling its social purpose, the disclosure could constitute a waiver of
attorney-client privilege and surely jeopardize a later finding that the
funder and the plaintiff are within a “common interest.”328 The
Delaware statute, however, avoids this problem entirely by not
requiring third-party assessment of the benefit corporation unless the
certificate of incorporation opts into such a requirement.329 As such,
public interest organizations could rest assured that any information
in the due diligence process would not be provided to any third parties.
4.

The benefit report is not public
Under the Model Legislation and Delaware PBC statute, a benefit
corporation must prepare a benefit report for shareholders

325. See supra notes 136, 212 (elaborating on the due diligence process and
information shared between the litigation financing firm, attorney, and client
before financing).
326. See supra notes 213–14 and accompanying text (explaining that preserving
attorney-client privilege when attorneys share confidential information with
financing firms may lie in the “common-interest exception”).
327. See, e.g., supra note 136 (explaining the due diligence process Burford
Capital undertakes before investing in a case and what types of documents may be
disclosed to the firm).
328. See supra note 214 and accompanying text (explaining the inconsistent
application of the “common-interest exception” to the litigation financing
arrangement for purposes of the attorney-client privilege). Plausibly, if the firm is a
benefit corporation with the stated purpose to fund the plaintiff’s case for its nonmonetary and monetary benefits, there is a decent argument that the litigation
financing firm is in more of a “common interest” with the plaintiff than would
otherwise be the case in the for-profit litigation finance industry.
329. See supra notes 268–69 (discussing how the Delaware PBC statute eliminates
the obligation under the Model Legislation to adopt a third-party standard in
assessing the benefit corporation’s public benefit after considerable criticism).
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indicating how it fulfills its social mission.330 In the litigation finance
context, such a benefit report may include attorney work product—
the attorney’s analysis of a given case, the prospect for success, a draft
of an important brief, or even the strategy for settling with the
defendant.331 In fact, given the extensive requirements of the benefit
report, some attorney work product by the public interest
organization may have to be included in this report to adequately
ensure shareholders that the public benefits are being promoted and
an adequate resolution to the controversy is being sought.332 Yet, if
this information were ever provided to the general public, waiver of
the attorney work product doctrine would be clear.333 Under the
Delaware PBC statute, however, directors of the corporation are
obligated to provide the benefit report only to shareholders of the
corporation and not the general public.334 This is an important
advantage. A public interest organization’s attorneys would be free to
provide attorney work product to the financing firm’s directors, who
could then include some of that information in their benefit report
to the shareholders.335 As discussed previously, the protection of the
330. See supra notes 261–62 and accompanying text (stating that the benefit
corporation must provide a benefit report).
331. See supra note 210 (indicating what types of materials may constitute attorney
work product). For example, in the Chevron litigation, an attorney brought in by the
litigation financing firm prepared a memo detailing the best strategy for enforcing
the judgment against the company or otherwise acquiring an adequate settlement.
See Mufson, supra note 176 (noting that attorneys prepared a confidential, so-called
“Invictus” memo outlining strategy for enforcing the judgment against Chevron).
332. See supra note 270 (providing the statutory requirements for the benefit
report under the Delaware PBC statute). Notably, the Delaware PBC statutory text
requires directors to include “objective factual information” on how the firm is
pursuing its goal of social impact and financing public interest organizations. This
would, at the very least, include the names of current cases in which the firm is
invested (which is currently kept confidential by for-profit firms). Likewise, it also
requires an “assessment” of the corporation’s success in meeting its social objectives,
which would plausibly include the type of relief obtained in a litigation effort. If the
officers failed to provide this, then the shareholders and investors could bring a suit
to obtain such information.
333. See supra note 211 (explaining that to ensure non-waiver of the attorney work
product doctrine, precautions must be taken that prevent the litigant’s adversaries
from obtaining the sensitive information).
334. See supra note 270 and accompanying text (stating that under the Delaware
PBC statute the public benefit report only has to be provided to shareholders).
335. A public interest organization may not want to share any attorney-work
product with a litigation financing firm given the risk, but due to the obligation of
the financing firm to identify and consider the non-monetary benefits of its
operations, it is likely that some information from a public interest organization’s
lawyers on their cases will have to be shared. Nevertheless, lawyers for the litigant
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attorney work product doctrine would extend to this information so
long as the director obtains a nondisclosure agreement from the
shareholders336—a seemingly simple task because the Delaware PBC
does not require that the information be made publicly available.
In turn, this facilitates information flow between shareholders,
directors, and the public interest organization regarding the social
impact of the litigation.
5.

Delaware law treatment of general corporate partners
Delaware’s corporate law also has the advantage of providing
flexibility in modifying the duties owed in a typical limited
partnership agreement. As discussed above, the envisioned entity
could follow much of the same path advocated for in the for-profit
industry by Professor Steinitz: the litigation financing firm acts as the
corporate general partner that manages the pooled assets of investors
in a limited partnership agreement,337 with the investors serving as
limited partners in the fund.338 But this arrangement raises its own
issues about what duties are owed to the limited partners by the
general partner. In Delaware, the default rule is that a general
partner owes fiduciary duties to the limited partners.339 Moreover, if
the general partner is a corporation, then that corporation’s directors
also owe fiduciary duties to the limited partners.340 For this reason, it
is likely that under Professor Steinitz’s framework, the directors of a
litigation financing firm acting as a corporate general partner owe
fiduciary duties to the investors serving as limited partners in the fund.
The social enterprise model, however, differs in one fundamental
respect: the litigation financing firm serving as a corporate general
partner in the limited partnership would be organized as a benefit
and directors of the firm should be selective in the amount of detail they include in
such reports, with the overall goal being to apprise investors of the social impact of
their investment while also not disclosing important strategy and factual information
relevant to ongoing litigation.
336. See supra notes 202, 216 and accompanying text (discussing case law that
indicates protection of the attorney work product doctrine will not be waived when
the lawyer obtains a nondisclosure agreement from the recipient).
337. See supra notes 142–47 and accompanying text (providing a short overview of
the limited partnership arrangement advocated for in the for-profit context).
338. Supra notes 142–47 and accompanying text.
339. See generally Winnifred A. Lewis, Waiving Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited
Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1029 (2013)
(providing an overview of Delaware corporate law regarding fiduciary duties in
limited partnerships).
340. See In re USACafes, L.P. Litig., 600 A.2d 43, 48 (Del. 1991) (imposing
fiduciary duties on directors of a corporate general partner to its limited partners).
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corporation. As discussed in Part III, the benefit corporation’s
directors have a modified fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the
corporation that allows the directors to consider factors outside of
the shareholder maximization norm.341 What duty, then, does the
benefit corporation owe to the limited partners if it follows Professor
Steinitz’s framework? Arguably, if the broad language of the benefit
corporation statute modifies the duties owed by its directors to
shareholders, then it also modifies the duties owed by those directors to
its limited partners.342 This conclusion finds additional textual support
in the Delaware PBC statute.343
This default rule344 has an advantage over the current for-profit
litigation financing arrangement as it provides more flexibility
depending on the type of investor. Notably, the limited partner
investors who want to realize a social impact on their investments (for
example, impact investors) would have some recourse against the
litigation financing firm’s directors if they were to wholly fail to
balance the specific benefit and profit goals of the fund or shirk any
341. See supra note 274 and accompanying text (discussing how the benefit
corporation statute modifies the director’s duties to shareholders by requiring that
the directors balance the financial interests of the stockholders and the public
benefit as described in its certificate of incorporation).
342. This modification, however, is an entirely new legal question. What fiduciary
duties does a benefit corporation acting as a corporate general partner in a limited
partnership owe to its limited partners? No case law exists on this question, as the
benefit corporation is a very recent invention. The Delaware Code, however, is
phrased broadly enough to impose a positive duty on directors to balance the
shareholder’s interests with the interests of those benefiting from the public benefit
in this situation. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (2013) (requiring that directors
“shall manage or direct the business and affairs of the public benefit corporation in a
manner that balances the pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best interests of
those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific public benefit
or public benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation” (emphasis added)).
343. See id. § 361 (providing that “[i]f a corporation elects to become a public
benefit corporation . . . , it shall be subject in all respects to the provisions of
[Delaware’s general corporation law] chapter, except to the extent this subchapter
imposes additional or different requirements, in which case such requirements shall
apply” (emphasis added)). Given this provision, the statute’s language in section
365(a) modifies the duties owed by directors in a benefit corporation.
344. Delaware allows the fiduciary duties owed by general partners to be modified
or eliminated entirely. See Lewis, supra note 339, at 1029 (explaining the
modifications and elimination of fiduciary duties under Delaware Law). If the
default rule, however, is that the fiduciary duties of the benefit corporation’s
directors include an obligation to balance the competing interests of shareholders
and other stakeholders, then impact investors should feel comfortable that they have
some recourse if the firm decides to not follow its social mission to finance public
interest litigation.
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obligation to public interest organizations or the plaintiffs.
Conversely, if the limited partner investors were more profit oriented
with a social benefit only as a secondary consideration (for example,
traditional investors), the litigation finance firm could assert that the
director is free to balance the interests of the limited partners with
the public interest organization that it funds. Either way, the
directors gain some freedom to make a decision on behalf of the
limited partnership fund that balances the public interest
organization’s interests, while also ensuring that traditional investors,
high net-worth individuals, and impact investors remain passive in the
management of the fund.345
C. The Public Policy Benefits
Organizing a litigation financing firm as a benefit corporation
generates a number of public policy benefits for the litigation finance
industry and the plaintiffs who receive financing. As explored in Part
II.B, the growth of the litigation finance industry in recent years is
justified by its potential to provide greater access to justice and
promote the private enforcement of the law, but it currently falls
short of achieving these goals.346 In particular, this Comment argues
that the industry’s failings in this regard are in large part due to: (1)
the exclusion of public interest organizations from the litigation
financing firm’s portfolio and (2) the regulatory uncertainty inherent
in the champerty doctrine.347 By establishing a litigation financing
firm as a social enterprise, both of these issues are addressed. First,
the social enterprise model more effectively aligns incentives between
the investors in the litigation and the plaintiffs than the for-profit
model. Second, it leads to stronger regulation of the relationship

345. See Steinitz, Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 142, at 500 (stating that the
limited partnership structure “isolate[s] investors from their cases, avoiding potential
conflicts with defendants”). It may also create a “wall” between investors and the
litigation financing firm that protects any confidential information shared with the
firm by the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s lawyer. See id. at 503. In our context, this may
be particularly important given that the parties may enter with good intentions to
pursue a social cause, but then grow wary of their investment as the time and
resources required in a litigation becomes more apparent.
346. See generally supra notes 151–52 (discussing the proponents’ arguments for
allowing less restricted forms of litigation financing and limiting application of the
champerty doctrine).
347. See supra Part II.B.1–2 (detailing how public interest organizations cannot tap
into for-profit litigation financing to fund their cases, and the uneven application of
the champerty, attorney-work product doctrine, and attorney-client privilege to the
litigation finance contract).
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between the funder, investors, and the plaintiff than the champerty
doctrine, while also protecting against possible abuse.
These
arguments are detailed below.
1.

Realigning incentives between funder and plaintiff
The exclusion of public interest organizations is primarily a
product of misaligned incentives facing the litigation financing firm,
as manager of an investment, and the public interest organization, as
attorney for the plaintiff.348 However, in the social enterprise model
outlined above, the incentives are much better aligned between the
funder (the benefit corporation), its own investors and shareholders
(the impact investors, high net worth individuals, and traditional
investors), the legal representation (the public interest organization)
and the eventual plaintiff who receives the funds to pursue the case
(the claimholder). Broadly speaking, all parties involved understand
that the goal of the litigation financing firm, as explicitly stated in its
certificate of incorporation, is enforcing a legal right for its potential
non-monetary and monetary relief.349 In other words, the model
moderates the for-profit drive so characteristic of the current
litigation finance industry by adopting a business form and
investment strategy that emphasizes goals much more aligned with
public interest organizations and their clients.
More particularly, organizing the litigation financing firm as a
benefit corporation aligns the incentives of the firm with the public
interest organization’s pursuit of non-monetary relief. Typically, forprofit litigation financing firms attempt to maximize profits and
“commodify” legal claims.350 However, when the litigation financing
firm is organized as a benefit corporation, the firm would become
uniquely interested in the non-monetary relief to be gained from
public interest litigation. For instance, the benefit corporation, in
pursuit of generating a “social benefit,” may now support a public
interest organization that seeks remedial relief resulting in an
injunction against the defendant. A change in the law or agency

348. See supra Part II.B.1 (describing how public interest organizations bring
impact cases that emphasize injunctive relief, while for-profit litigation financing
firms pursue commercial cases that emphasize high monetary returns).
349. See supra note 280 (providing a hypothetical specific benefit to be included in
the litigation finance firm’s articles of incorporation as required under the
Delaware PBC statute).
350. See Steinitz, Whose Claim, supra note 132, at 1321 (discussing that some may
oppose litigation finance because of the possibility for “reduction of legal claims,
particularly of nonbusiness legal claims, into a mere commodity”).
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policy may also be valuable to the organization.351 For the benefit
corporation, these remedies could constitute a “public benefit,”
which it could then promote in its benefit report to shareholders and
in advertising to other public interest organizations.352 From this, the
litigation financing firm gains a reputation among public interest
organizations, while also apprising other potential impact investors of
how litigation finance can bring about meaningful social change.353
Additionally, these realigned incentives could result in altering the
contractual arrangements between the parties; for instance, the
definition of “award” in the contracts between the litigation financing
firm and the plaintiff may change.354 As discussed above, even when
for-profit litigation financing firms fund public interest litigation
because of a large possible monetary return, the contract may require
that the value of any non-monetary relief be taken out of the plaintiff’s
share of the overall award.355 In fact, the contract in the Chevron
litigation explicitly included the non-monetary relief in the definition
of “award,” and stated that any “[d]isputes regarding noncash award
value are to be resolved by a single arbitrator, who is an accounting or
valuation expert, in an expedited process.”356 This, in effect,
increased the total amount of litigation proceeds earned by the
plaintiff from which the funder took a 20 to 30% share.357 Yet, if the
litigation-financing firm is a benefit corporation looking to generate
a social benefit in addition to a monetary return, it has a direct
351. See supra notes 158–60 (describing how public interest organizations often do
not pursue profit but injunctive and symbolic relief).
352. See supra note 261 and accompanying text (explaining that the Delaware
PBC, in an effort to create transparency, requires a director to distribute a public
benefit report to shareholders).
353. See Steinitz, Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 142, at 518 (arguing, in the
for-profit context, that “regulators and lawmakers, including judges, should consider
the critical role of reputation markets which, in turn, rely on the transparency of the
industry”). In this context, the litigation financing firm would have a direct incentive
to be transparent in its investments because it garners “reputational capital” from the
work it is doing.
354. The financing firm could provide for a fiduciary duty in its contract with the
plaintiff because such an obligation is much less of a direct conflict for directors
under the benefit corporation form. See infra notes 370–75 and accompanying text
(discussing the fiduciary duty as a better form of self-regulation).
355. See supra notes 185–87 and accompanying text (discussing the contract in the
Chevron litigation).
356. Steinitz, Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 142, at 478.
357. See Steinitz & Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 154, at 740
n.120 (explaining that “Burford’s investment in the Chevron–Ecuador dispute . . .
penalized plaintiffs for receiving clean-ups rather than funds by requiring them to
pay the funder for its pro-rated share of such a remedy”).
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incentive to exclude the value of any non-monetary relief from the
contract’s definition of “award.” In this fashion, when the litigation
financing firm provides funding, it would support not only a
monetary recovery but also the social benefit obtained through
non-monetary relief.
The public interest organization’s incentives are also better aligned
with those of its funders because the financing firm would be less
likely to try to compromise the organization’s attorney-client
relationships with its clients. As previously discussed, current
litigation financing firms may seek to control litigation to earn a
better return for its shareholders; mainly, they may pressure the
attorney to settle early for a monetary sum or try to bring in an
attorney that is more hospitable to the firm’s objectives.358 Yet, when
the litigation financing firm’s explicit purpose is to support public
interest organizations’ legal efforts and broadly pursue a social
benefit, the benefit corporation has a strong incentive to partner with
attorneys who are more interested in the broad, social impact the
litigation hopes to achieve than the monetary relief that may occur.359
Furthermore, as discussed above, the benefit corporation’s interests
in non-monetary and monetary relief better align with a plaintiff’s
often mixed and “bundled interests” in claims that offer various levels
of relief.360 This incentive, in turn, goes a long way towards ensuring
that the firm does not also pressure the public interest organization
to settle early and earn a quick return.361 Alternatively, the benefit
corporation may be more willing to support the litigant who forgoes
an early settlement offer in favor of going to court for an injunction
or symbolic victory.362 Either way, the benefit corporation is less
obligated to the shareholder maximization norm than its for-profit
alternative, resulting in less pressure on the attorney’s ability to
provide candid and objective advice to his client.

358. See supra notes 162–64 (explaining that a litigation financing firm may try to
control litigation by choosing an attorney or obtaining power over whether to settle a case).
359. See supra note 68 (describing how public interest organizations now situate
litigation efforts in their broader social campaigns).
360. Steinitz, Whose Claim, supra note 132, at 1322.
361. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (stating that litigation financing
firms have an incentive to pressure attorneys to settle a case early for monetary value
while a public interest organization will often want to pursue a case for its monetary
and non-monetary relief).
362. See supra note 170–171 and accompanying text (noting that litigation financing
may embolden litigants to pursue trial remedies and resist monetary settlement).
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Promoting a better regulatory regime for litigation finance
Organizing a litigation financing firm as a benefit corporation may
also mean that the entity fares better than a strictly for-profit
litigation financing firm under the uncertain champerty doctrine. In
Massachusetts and other states, the champerty doctrine has been
abandoned and other doctrines govern litigation-finance
agreements.363
In these states, the for-profit and benefit
corporation’s contracts with plaintiffs would likely be enforceable,
though it is possible that a benefit corporation’s contract would, on
its face, appear less unconscionable. In other states, however, the
doctrine is not abandoned but rather moderated to prohibit
litigation financing when it promotes unmeritorious claims or results
in a funder exercising control over or “intermeddling” with
litigation.364 The social enterprise model, as discussed above, realigns
incentives so that litigation financing firms have less incentive to
control litigation for its purely monetary benefits;365 as such, any
exerted pressure or control on the plaintiff’s attorney becomes much
less likely. Most importantly, the benefit corporation’s effort to fund
public interest litigation would fit squarely within the exception to
New York’s champerty doctrine, which refuses to enforce an
agreement that has “the sole purpose of initiating litigation where no
prior right to the underlying claim exists.”366
The benefit
corporation’s specific benefit requires the corporation to enter into
cases already filed by public interest organizations, ensuring that a
prior right to the underlying claim exits.367
As commentators advocate rolling back champerty to promote
growth in litigation finance, some have proposed that the doctrine
continue to prohibit funding in some types of cases but otherwise
allow litigation finance to flourish in the commercial context.368
363. See supra notes 198–99 and accompanying text (stating that Massachusetts has
completely abandoned the champerty doctrine and opted for using other doctrines
to control the issues that may be raised by litigation finance, such as
unconscionability and frivolous litigation).
364. See supra note 201 and accompanying text (summarizing how champerty is
applied in states that retain the doctrine).
365. See supra Part IV.C.1 (detailing how a litigation financing firm opting for the
benefit corporation form would have different incentives than a for-profit litigation
finance firm).
366. Steinitz & Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 154, at 727.
367. See supra note 280 and accompanying text (providing the specific benefit
language that a litigation financing firm organized as a benefit corporation may adopt).
368. See Sebok, supra note 206, at 108 (contending that “[l]imiting profit
maintenance on the basis of what kind of suit the maintenance supports would seem
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However, if litigation financing is strictly prohibited in certain cases,
such as class actions or public interest litigation, that would seem to
cut against the original reason the practice was allowed in the first
place: access to justice.369 Thus, it may be advisable that instead
policymakers mandate that certain cases (for instance, those based on
a private right of action or class action) be restricted in accepting
financing from a litigation financing firm organized as a benefit
corporation. This would ensure that the litigants who need litigation
financing the most receive the benefit of a litigation financing
industry, while also avoiding the more negative consequences
discussed above.
Ultimately, opting for the social enterprise model may also
indirectly lead to better self-regulation by litigation financing firms in
their contracts with plaintiffs. As it now stands, a for-profit litigation
financing firm that owes a fiduciary duty to a plaintiff would be in
direct conflict with the firm’s obligations to shareholders and
investors to earn a profitable return.370 It is not surprising, then, that
for-profit litigation financing firms do not impose such a duty on
themselves in their contracts with plaintiffs.371
The benefit
corporation statute, however, modifies a director’s duties to allow
consideration of factors outside of shareholder value;372 in fact, a
director in a benefit corporation has an obligation to balance the

to be an obvious means of regulation for a state that wanted to support champerty as
a matter of general principle while recognizing that, as a matter of public policy,
there might be some types of litigation which are ill-suited to third-party
investment”); see also Steinitz, Whose Claim, supra note 132, at 1321–22 (arguing that
“[l]egislatures and courts should decide which litigation subject matters should, as a
matter of public policy, be subject to commodification and which should not”).
369. See supra notes 149–50 and accompanying text (asserting that proponents of
litigation finance point to increased access to justice for disadvantaged parties and
greater private enforcement of the law as potential benefits of a less restricting
regulatory regime).
370. See supra note 184 (stating that in the litigation financing context, a fiduciary
duty would moderate a number of the issues impacting the relationship between the
litigation financing firm and the plaintiffs but its effectiveness would conflict with the
firm’s obligations to maximize value for shareholders).
371. See Steinitz & Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 141, at 740
(discussing how “[t]o date, no such regulation has been imposed [by courts or
legislatures], leaving it up to the private ordering of the parties. Because of the
fiduciary duty’s potency, a funder may simply refuse its imposition through contract”);
see also supra note 183 (providing the statutory text of the contract in Burford’s
investment in the Chevron litigation that explicitly disclaimed any fiduciary duties).
372. See supra notes 268–76 and accompanying text (discussing the legal argument
that a director could make when faced with challenges to his business decision).

WILSON.PAGEPROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

2/3/2015 8:10 PM

LITIGATION FINANCE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST

453

interests of those who stand to gain from the stated benefit.373 In this
way, the benefit corporation statute serves to moderate the litigation
finance firm’s duty to maximize profits for its investors, which in turn
makes establishing a fiduciary duty to plaintiffs much less of a direct
conflict.374 Provided with this flexibility, the directors may well
establish fiduciary duties with their funded plaintiffs that would
otherwise not be provided in the for-profit context, thereby curtailing
many of the same practices that the overly restrictive champerty
doctrine prohibits.375
CONCLUSION
This Comment began with an alarming statistic on the scarcity of
public interest lawyers and the overwhelming demand for their
services. Moreover, it posited that public interest organizations and
their litigation efforts play a crucial role in the United States’ private
enforcement regime. Yet despite all of this, a seemingly inapposite
trend is apparent: these organizations are dramatically underfunded.
Further, when the same organizations turn to third parties to help
fund their litigation efforts, be it a non-profit donor or a for-profit
litigation financing firm, the funding is either too limited or comes
with strings attached: the foundations and non-profits can only offer
a limited amount of resources and expertise in financing public
interest litigation, while the for-profit litigation financing firms either
exert associated pressures on plaintiffs and their counsel, or abstain
from financing public interest litigation altogether. Somewhat
ironically, the litigation finance sector continues to claim it
champions the very two things that public interest law seeks to
373. See supra note 274 and accompanying text (providing the statutory text of the
Delaware PBC statute and discussing the possibility that its language may require
more of directors than under the Model Legislation).
374. Likewise, the benefit corporation statute states that the certificate of
incorporation may state that any failure to satisfy the balance requirements of the
statute will not constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty or good faith. See supra note
273 (providing statutory text). Opting into this provision would similarly make any
fiduciary duty to a plaintiff much less of a conflict.
375. See Steinitz, Whose Claim, supra note 132, at 1328–29 (arguing that a fiduciary
duty is the best way to ensure the litigation financing firm does not attempt to
control the litigation because it obligates the firm to consider conflicts of interest,
encourages reaching settlement offers that are in the plaintiff’s interests, and forces
the firm to ask “whether nonmonetary remedies better serve the client than do mere
monetary damages” (emphasis added)). This is particularly important when the
funded parties are a public interest organization’s clients who often pursue nonmonetary relief. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (explaining that organizations
bring cases in areas of the law may involve interests that are not strictly monetary).
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promote: access to justice and private enforcement of the law.
Realizing this unsatisfactory status quo, this Comment proposes a
potential new solution whereby a litigation financing firm organizes
as a benefit corporation with the goal of funding public interest
litigation. Additionally, it described how this model alleviates many
of the regulatory issues and promotes a number of public policy
benefits in the litigation-finance industry. In this manner, the
Comment sought to chart a legal path forward that allows public
interest organizations and litigation financing firms to join in a
venture that promotes access to justice and private enforcement of law.
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